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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTIONS-STRICT SCRU-
TINY OF STATE BALLOT ACCESS RESTRICTIONS AS-
SURES EASIER ACCESS FOR INDEPENDENT PRESIDEN-
TIAL CANDIDATES-Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564
(1983).
On April 24, 1980, Rep. John Anderson (R-Ill.) announced
that he was an independent candidate for the presidency of the
United States. Thereafter, he met all of the substantive requirements
for having his name placed on the ballot in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia for the November, 1980 general election.' By
that time, however, it was too late for Anderson to qualify for a
position on the Ohio ballot because the statutory deadlines for filing
a statement of candidacy had passed.2 On May 16, Anderson's sup-
porters tendered a nominating petition to Anthony J. Celebrezze,
Jr., Ohio's Secretary of State. Celebrezze refused to accept the peti-
tion because it had not been filed within the time required by section
3513.257 of the Ohio Revised Code.'
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1. Specifically, his supporters gathered the requisite signatures of registered voters, filed
the necessary documents, and submitted the required filing fees. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103
S. Ct. 1564 (1983).
2. It was also too late for Anderson to qualify in four other states. See Anderson v.
Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730 (Me. 1980), afftd, 634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Mor-
ris, 500 F. Supp. 1095 (Md. 1980), affd, 636 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Hooper,
498 F. Supp. 898, 905 (N.M. 1980); Anderson v. Mills, 497 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Ky. 1980),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981).
3. Section 3513.257 provides, in relevant part:
Each person desiring to become an independent candidate for an office for
which candidates may be nominated at a primary election, except persons desir-
ing to become independent joint candidates for the offices of governor and lieu-
tenant governor, shall file no later than four p.m. of the seventy-fifth day before
the day of the primary election immediately preceding the general election at
which such candidacy is to be voted for by the voters, a statement of candidacy
and nominating petition as provided in § 3513.261 of the Revised Code.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3513.257 (Page Supp. 1982). The Code defines "independent candi-
date" as
any candidate who does not consider himself affiliated with a political party,
and who has his name certified on the office-type ballot at a general or special
election through the filing of a statement of candidacy and nominating petition,
as prescribed in § 3513.257 . . . of the Revised Code.
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On May 19, 1980, Anderson and three voters brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
challenging the constitutionality of Ohio's early filing deadline." The
district court held the deadline unconstitutional and granted sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiffs, ordering Celebrezze to file Ander-
son's nominating petition and other documents.6
Respondent Celebrezze then unsuccessfully sought expedited re-
view in both the court of appeals and the United States Supreme
Court.' When the case was finally heard by the circuit court, that
court reversed the district court.' The circuit court held that Ohio's
early filing deadline ensured voters an opportunity for a careful
study of the presidential candidates and a chance to see how the can-
didates withstood political campaign scrutiny.'
Because of a conflict among the circuit courts,' the Supreme
Court granted certiorari." In a six-three decision, the Supreme
Id. § 3501.01.
4. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
5. Id. at 124. The deadline was held unconstitutional on two grounds: (1) it imposed an
impermissible burden on the first amendment associational rights of Anderson and his Ohio
supporters, thereby diluting the potential value of votes that might have been cast for him in
other states, and (2) it violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment be-
cause it required an independent candidate to declare his candidacy in March without mandat-
ing comparable action by the nominee of a political party. Id. at 139.
6. Celebrezze v. Anderson, 448 U.S. 914 (1980). Curiously, respondent did not seek to
stay the district court's order. Anderson's name was added to the ballot because his nominating
papers were filed as per the district court's order, and the election was held while appeal to the
circuit court was pending. In fact, Anderson made it onto the ballot of every state and the
District of Columbia. 69 A.B.A. J. 824 (1983). In Ohio, Anderson received 254,472 votes, or
5.9% of the votes cast. Nationally, he received 5,720,060 votes or 6.6% of the total. Anderson,
103 S. Ct. at 1567 n.4 (citing OHIO ELECTION STATISTICS 152 (1980) and AMEaiCA VorEs
14, A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ELECTION STATISTICS 19-20 (1981)).
7. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981).
8. Id. at 563. Specifically, the circuit court found that the Ohio filing deadline for inde-
pendent candidates merely required presidential candidates to be in the public eye for a signifi-
cant period of time, advancing the state's interest in the careful election of presidential candi-
dates. Id.
The court held that the equal protection argument was without merit. The court reasoned
that the provision in the Ohio Revised Code that partisan candidates may run in the general
election without running in the primary does not, in fact, create a right for partisan candidates
at all, but rather "[ilt is a right of political parties, with rather an incidental effect on partisan
candidates." Id. at 567.
9. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding for the state filing
deadline), and Anderson v. Quinn, 634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980) and Anderson v. Morris, 636
F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980) (both affirming district court decisions holding for Anderson in strik-
ing down state filing deadlines for independent candidates).
10. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 456 U.S. 960 (1982). Although the 1980 election had long
since passed, the case was not moot because the question of ballot access for independent candi-
dates was, and is, an ongoing problem. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). In Storer,
ANDERSON v. CELEBREZZE
Court reversed the circuit court and held that Ohio's filing deadline
was indeed unconstitutional."1
The Court agreed with Anderson's arguments on all counts.
Specifically, the Court found that the Ohio filing deadline (1) bur-
dened the first amendment associational rights of independent voters
and candidates, (2) placed significant state-imposed restrictions on
the nationwide electoral process, (3) discriminated against candidates
and voters whose political preferences lie outside existing political
parties, and (4) implicated a uniquely important national interest in
that the president and vice-president are the only elected officials
who represent all voters in the United States and, hence, the impact
of the votes cast in each state affects the votes cast in other states."
The Court set forth a strict scrutiny test to be applied by courts
in resolving constitutional challenges to state election laws." First,
the court must balance the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury against the rights protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate." Second, the court must
identify and evaluate the precise interests asserted by the state, in-
cluding the legitimacy, strength, and necessity of those interests, to
justify the burden imposed by its rule. 5
Applying the first part of this balancing test, the Court found
that the Ohio filing deadline burdened the first amendment associa-
tional rights of independent voters and candidates.1 The Court re-
lied on the reasoning of Williams v. Rhodes,"7 the first case in which
the Court considered the constitutionality of ballot access restrictions
on independent candidates. In that case, Ohio had an election statute
that required a number of signatures on petitions equal to fifteen
percent of the number of voters in the last gubernatorial election. 8
an action to challenge the constitutionality of statutes establishing requirements for indepen-
dent candidates to achieve ballot status was not moot by virtue of the mere fact that the elec-
tion date had passed during the pendency of the case. The Supreme Court in Storer held that
where "construction of the statue, an understanding of its operation, and possible constitutional
limits on its application, will have the effect of simplifying future challenges, thus increasing
the likelihood that timely filed cases can be adjudicated before an election is held." Id. at 737
n.8.
11. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. 1564 (1983).
12. Id. at 1570-73.
13. Id. at 1570.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. d. at 1570-73.
17. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
18. 1929 Ohio Laws 113 § 4785-61. The Ohio Legislature has since reduced the re-
quirement to one percent. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.01 (Supp. 1982).
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In addition, the statute required the formation of an elaborate party
organization in order for third party and independent candidates to
gain access to the ballot."'
The Williams Court declared the statute unconstitutional, find-
ing that it placed substantially unequal burdens on the rights to vote
and to associate because minority parties were denied the same op-
portunity as partisan candidates to win votes.' 0 The Court found
that these rights were expressly implicated by ballot access restric-
tions, and, therefore, were subject to the strict scrutiny standard of
equal protection review.' 1
Applying the second part of the balancing test, the Court in
Anderson identified and handily rejected each of Ohio's asserted in-
terests. Ohio first claimed that the deadline allowed a longer time for
voter education. The Court held that it would be unrealistic in this
age of modern telecommunications to think that it would take more
than seven months to inform the electorate about a candidate just
because he lacked a party label."
Ohio next claimed that it was providing equal treatment for
partisan and independent candidates alike since a candidate partici-
pating in a primary election had to declare his or her candidacy on
the same date as an independent. The Court found that both the
burdens and benefits of the respective requirements were materially
different' s and that the reasons for early filing for a primary candi-
date were inapplicable to independent candidates in the general
.19. Specifically, party members had to elect county committee members at the primary
election. 1924 Ohio Laws 113 § 4785-63. A state central committeee had to be elected as well.
Id. at §§ 4785-62 to 63.
20. 393 U.S. at 31.
21. Id. at 32. Under this standard, the challenged provision can only be upheld if it is it)
furtherance of a compelling state interest. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW § 12-
8 at 602 (1978).
The Court held for the first time that while citizens of a state are free to associate with
one of the two major political parties, to participate in the nomination of their chosen party's
candidates for public office, and to cast their ballots in the general election, the state must also
provide feasible means for other political parties and candidates to appear. 393 U.S. at 32.
22. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 103 S. Ct. at 1574. The Court also stated, "this reasoning
applies with even greater force to a presidential election, which receives more intense public-
ity." Id. It was also not self-evident that the interest in voter education was even served by the
early filing deadline. Id. at 1575.
23. Id. at 1575. In fact, the Court found that the consequences of failing to meet the
statutory deadline were entirely different for party primary candidates and independent candi-
dates: the name of the partisan candidate nominated at the convention would appear on the
Ohio ballot in the general election even if he or she did not decide to run until after Ohio's
March deadline had passed. The independent candidate, on the other hand, would simply lose
out if he or she decided to wait too long. Id.
[Vol. 24
ANDERSON v. CELEBREZZE
election.24
Thirdly, Ohio relied on the Court's decision in Storer v.
Brown2" in claiming that the filing deadline preserved the stability of
the state political system.2 In Storer, the Court applied the strict
scrutiny test of Williams to uphold a California election statute that
required independent candidates to be politically disaffiliated for at
least one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election.27
Justice White concluded that the state may limit voter participation
to one of two alternative procedures-partisan or non-partisan-for
nominating candidates for the general election ballot. The Court
held that the statute requiring party disaffiliation was not unconsti-
tutional since it involved no discrimination against independent can-
didates. 2' Further, the statute reflected a "compelling state interest"
in protecting the electoral process from "splintered parties and unre-
strained factionalism."29 The Storer Court stated that factionalism
may lead to the destruction of the stability of the state's political
system.3 0 However, the Court in Anderson stated that this did not
suggest that a political party could invoke the powers of a state to
assure that party's complete control over its own members and sup-
porters.8" Rather, the Anderson Court found that the deadline
amounted to nothing more than a desire to protect existing political
parties from competition generated by independent candidates who
had previously been affiliated with a party-and, as such, conflicted
with first amendment values.
3 2
24. Id. The Court also agreed with the district court in holding that although a write-in
vote for the independent candidate is always available, it is an inadequate alternative to ballot
placement. "The realities of the electoral process ... strongly suggest that 'access' via write-in
votes falls far short of access in terms of having the name of the candidate on the ballot." Id.
n.26 (quoting Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 719 n.5).
25. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
26. 103 S. Ct. at 1577-78.
27. 415 U.S. at 738-46.
28. The provision was not discriminatory because a party candidate, as well, could not
change parties within a year prior to the election. Id. at 733-34.
29. Id. at 736. The Court also found that the California provision: (1) protected the
direct primary process-an integral part of the entire election process-by refusing to 'recog-
nize independent candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alter-
native course to the ballot, (2) worked against independent candidacies "prompted by short-
range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel," and (3) was a substantial barrier to a party
fielding an "independent" candidate to capture and "bleed off" votes in the general election
that might well go to another party. Id. at 735.
The Court thus concluded that the California provision furthered the state's compelling
interest in the stability of its political system. Id. at 736.
30. Id. at 736.
31. 103 S. Ct. at 1577.
32. Id. at 1576-77.
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Fourthly, Ohio contended that the deadline helped to maintain
the integrity of various routes to the ballot for the presidency. This
interest was not served, the Court stated, because Ohio's presidential
preference primary did not serve to narrow the field for the general
election. 3
Finally, the state contended that by forcing independent candi-
dates to register early, there would be less chance of an independent
candidate "splintering" his or her party to "bleed off" votes in the
general election. In essence, the deadline protected parties from in-
traparty feuding. In fact, the Court held, the deadline may have ac-
tually impaired the state's interest in preserving party harmony.3 4
In his dissent," Justice Rehnquist, rather than applying the
strict scrutiny test that the majority used, argued that the Ohio ballot
access laws need only be rational and allow reasonable-not abso-
lute-access to the general election ballot to independent candi-
dates.86 Relying on Storer, the dissent found that the deadline would
not have totally excluded Anderson from the general election ballot
because write-in votes were still available."' It further stated that the
deadline did not impede Anderson's signature gathering efforts;
rather, "a reasonably diligent" independent candidate should have
had little difficulty in obtaining the requisite signatures in a timely
fashion. 8
Next, although the majority held that the deadline infringed
upon attempts by non-partisan candidates who attempted to run af-
ter the March deadline, the dissenters stated that there is, in fact,
little chance of a serious candidacy if the declaration of such candi-
dacy is made after spring of an election year. 9 The dissent also rea-
soned that because Anderson had already declared as a Republican
in Ohio and had dropped out because he realized he could not get
the Republican nomination, the deadline only prohibited him from
33. Id. at 1578.
34. Id. The Court also held that the state actually has a less important interest in regu-
lating presidential, as opposed to local, elections because the outcome of presidential elections
will be largely determined by voters outside the state. Id. at 1573. However, the author con-
tends that this reasoning should not be dispositive and suggests that the state still has an
interest in regulating presidential elections within its own boundaries although this interest
must be promulgated within prescribed constitutional limits.
35. Id. at 1579.
36. Id. at 1580.
37. 103 S. Ct. at 1580 n.I. But see supra note 24.
38. Id. at 1580 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 742). In fact five other independent candi-
dates submitted nominating petitions with the necessary signatures before the deadline. Id
39. Id. at 1581 n.3.
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having two chances at the presidency in the same election year.'0
Finally, the dissent held that the deadline did not serve to pro-
tect political parties; rather, it merely required an independent can-
didate to make an early decision to run for office.'" In fact, the dis-
senters reasoned, party candidates actually have a harder time
getting on the ballot because they must be nominated by their party
as well as obtaining the signatures required by the state.'"
Ballot access restriction cases have been see-sawing in the Su-
preme Court since 1968.' Three years after Williams v. Rhodes,44
in which the Court used a first amendment fundamental rights anal-
ysis to strike down minimum signature requirements for independent
and third party candidates in Ohio, the Court in Jenness v. Fortson
retreated from the fundamental rights approach.' In Jenness, the
Court rejected plaintiffs' contention that petition signatures and
other qualifying requirements denied independent candidates and
their supporters equal protection of the law and infringed upon their
first amendment rights of free speech and association.' Instead, the
Court affirmed the state's interest in regulating elections and sus-
tained a Georgia election statute which required signatures totaling
five percent of the total vote for third parties and independent candi-
dates in the last election.'
The focus of the Jenness opinion was the right of the state to
regulate its elections, while in Williams the interest of the candidate
and his or her supporters was of central concern. In Jenness, the
Court held that the state has an obligation to protect the integrity of
the political process from frivolous candidacies.' 8 The Court indi-
cated that in order to achieve this, the state should require a prelimi-
nary showing of moderate support before printing the name of a po-
40. Id. at 1581. Thus, the Ohio filing deadline could be classified as a "sore loser"
statute of sorts, in that it prohibits a candidate defeated in a party primary from appearing on
the general election ballot. See Anderson v. Morris, 636 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1980). In the
instant case, however, Anderson was not actually defeated in the primary, but had dropped out
before it took place.
41. 103 S. Ct. at 1583.
42. Id at 1584.
43. See Developments in the Law - Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111 (1975) and Com-
ment, Ballot Access: Applying the Constitutional Balancing Test to the West Virginia Election
Code, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 227 (1980) (both setting forth the background of ballot access cases
decided by the Supreme Court).
44. 393 U.S. 23.
45. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 442.
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litical organization's candidate on the ballot."9 This requirement
would help to avoid confusion at the general election. 50 In articulat-
ing its concern for the state's interest in regulating elections, theJen-
ness Court approached a "rational relation" standard of review
rather than the strict scrutiny standard of Williams. 1 Although the
Court found the state's interests to be "compelling," it in fact ac-
cepted regulations that had only a rational connection to the state's
purpose.52
In Storer,3 the Court once again applied the Williams strict
scrutiny test to uphold the California disaffiliation statute.54 When
John Anderson challenged the Ohio statute, there were already two
standards of review regarding ballot access cases in the federal court
system-a "minimum rationality" standard and a "strict scrutiny"
standard."' These two conflicting standards came to a head in March
of 1983 in Anderson.
5 0
The district court applied a standard equal protection analy-
sis,57 balancing the interests of the state in maintaining a classifica-
tion against the burden on individual rights imposed by the classifi-
cation, and held that the classification was unnecessary to achieve
any compelling state interest.58 The Supreme Court, however, based
its conclusions directly on the first and fourteenth amendments and
did not engage in a separate equal protection analysis. 59 Instead, the
Court chose to rely on the analysis of prior election cases which ap-
plied the "fundamental rights" strand of equal protection analysis."
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Developments in the Law, supra note 44, at 1139. This can be inferred from the fact
that the Court upheld the state statute, finding that the burden on minor parties was slight.
Comment, supra note 44, at 233. See also, Note, Nominating Petition Requirements For
Third-Party and Independent Candidate Ballot Access, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 974, 980-81
(1977).
52. Comment, supra note 44, at 233.
53. 415 U.S. 724.
54. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
55. See Anderson, 664 F.2d at 565; Morris, 636 F.2d at 57.
56. 103 S. Ct. 1564.
57. 499 F. Supp. at 130.
58. Id.
59. 103 S. Ct. at 1569 n.7.
60. Id. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Williams, 393 U.S. 23. Al-
though the Court stated that it was not embarking on a separate equal protection analysis, the
Court's analysis and rejection of Ohio's arguments seem to closely resemble this type of analy-
sis. See supra notes 12-34 and accompanying text. The Court applied a strict scrutiny balanc-
ing test and found that the state simply had no compelling interest in maintaining a filing
deadline for independent candidates. Anderson, 103 S. Ct. at 1573-79.
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The Supreme Court has taken a special interest over the years
since the 1960's civil rights movement in preserving the right of all
citizens to vote freely for the candidate of their choice. 1 The freedom
to associate with others for the common advancement of political be-
liefs and ideas is a form of "orderly group activity" protected by the
first and fourteenth amendments.62 Even the most basic of rights is
illusory if the right to vote is undermined.6"
With its decision in Anderson, the Court has moved toward ap-
plying a strict scrutiny standard when considering state ballot access
restrictions. The Court's decision does not overrule Storer. Rather,
Storer can be distinguished because the portion of the case that up-
held a compelling interest on the part of the state dealt with state
congressional candidates." ' In this respect, it seems only fair that the
state should be allowed to play a significantly greater role in the
regulation of elections affecting the direct representation of its citi-
zens in Washington.
In the sphere of national elections, however, the right of the
state to restrict ballot access should be strictly scrutinized because
what happens in one state usually has a direct effect in another. A
uniform rule in the realm of national elections will best serve the
interests of the American people. That uniformity now exists after
Anderson. One state will not be able to impose an unconstitutional
early filing deadline upon an independent presidential candidate who
would thereby be denied ballot access.
If an independent candidate now wishes to obtain ballot status
in the general election, he must still fulfill the substantive statutory
requirements that the particular state imposes. However, if the stat-
ute is challenged, the state must show that it has a compelling need
in the enforcement of the statute's provisions.
With its decision in Anderson, the Supreme Court has not
closed the door on states exercising their powers of supervision over
elections and for setting qualifications for voters-it has merely held
that the states may not infringe upon other basic constitutional pro-
tections when doing so.
Stephen J. Schwartz
61. See, e.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974);Jenness, 403 U.S. 431;
Williams, 393 U.S. 23.
62. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
63. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 127.
64. 415 U.S. at 728-37. With respect to the claims by the presidential candidates, the
Court remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 738.
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RECONCILING THE PUBLIC TRUST AND APPROPRIA-
TIVE WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA: National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346 (1983), modified, 33 Cal. 3d 726a, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346 (1983).
The right to use and divert water in California has traditionally
been governed by a dual system of water rights: the riparian system
and the appropriative system.' The common law riparian system of
water allocation provides that an owner of land contiguous to a wa-
tercourse has the right to use that water on the land.2 The statutory
appropriative system gives the right to use and divert water to the
first person who does so for reasonable and beneficial purposes.' The
latter was developed during the California gold rush when water
was needed for use on land not adjacent to water sources. Because of
the great agricultural and domestic demands for water, the appropri-
ative system has dominated California water rights and is now regu-
lated by a statutorily created administrative board: the California
© 1984 by Jeanne Zolezzi
1. See Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and California Water Law: National Au-
dubon Society v. Department of Water and Power, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 653 (1982).
2. Id.
3. All water rights in California are subject to "reasonable and beneficial" use require-
ments. Thus, riparian owners must put water to reasonable or beneficial use before they can
use it to the exclusion of appropriators. This additional requirement that the state's water
resources be fully and beneficially used promotes the development and use of water resources.
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (formerly CAL. CONST. art. XIV § 3) provides in part:
[B]ecause of the conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare re-
quires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest
extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or
unreasonble method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of
such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use
thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare. The right to
water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water
course in this State . . . shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably
required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right... shall not extend
to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable
method of diversion of water. Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach
to, but to no more than so much of the flow thereof as may be required or used
consistently with this section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may
be made adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided,
however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as depriving any ripa-
rian owner of the reasonable use of water of the stream to which his land is
riparian under reasonable methods of diversion and use, or of depriving any
appropriator of water to which he is lawfully entitled.
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Water Resources Control Board (Water Board).
The public trust doctrine, in contrast, has applied only sporadi-
cally to California water rights. The doctrine, developed from Ro-
man and English laws, has traditionally protected the public's right
to use navigable waters for certain activities. This doctrine holds that
the public's right to water is held in trust by the state and is superior
to all private claims of right."
The California water rights system and the common law public
trust doctrine developed independently and met for the first time in a
recent California Supreme Court decision, National Audubon Soci-
ety v. Superior Court.' The court balanced increasing demands for
water against increasing environmental concerns and held that
neither doctrine could stand alone, and that an integration of the two
was required to make California water law more responsible to the
state's diverse needs.'
The court's decision has been crucial in the sixty-year old war
raging over the waters of Mono Lake, the second largest lake in
California, located at the base of the Sierra Nevadas.7 Mono Lake is
naturally saline and, while it supports no fish, brine shrimp and
brine flies thrive in its habitat. Migratory birds feed on the shrimp
and flies and ninety percent of California's gull population breed at
the lake.8 In 1940, the predecessor to the California State Water
Resources Board9 granted the City of Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power (DWP) a permit to divert the freshwater streams
that filled Mono Lake. 0 In 1941, the city completed its aqueduct
which, with a 1970 addition, currently diverts almost the entire
source of freshwater from the lake.11
As a result of these diversions, the level of the lake has fallen
forty-six feet. The resulting decrease in volume has increased the
salinity level of the remaining water to three times that of the ocean.
The increased salinity may destroy the brine shrimp and flies which
inhabit the lake, thus cutting off a food supply for migratory birds."'
4. See infra text accompanying notes 27-37.
5. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983), modified, 33 Cal. 3d 726a,
658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 424, 658 P.2d at 711, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
8. Id.
9. The Division of Water Resources was the predecessor to the California State Water
Resources Control Board.
10. 33 Cal. 3d at 424, 658 P.2d at 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 430, 658 P.2d at 715, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
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In addition, the reduced lake level has turned one of the lake's is-
lands into a peninsula, thus allowing predators to invade gull nesting
areas.
13
Environmental groups, led by the National Audubon Society,
filed suit in Mono County Superior Court on May 21, 1979, against
the State of California and DWP to enjoin the diversions."' DWP
moved to change venue, and the case was removed to Alpine County
Superior Court.1 In January, 1980, the DWP named the federal
government as a cross-complainant, and the government removed the
case to the United States District Court for Eastern California."
The DWP subsequently filed a motion to stay the proceedings
under the federal abstention doctrine, asserting that the case involved
fundamental principles of state law which had never been addressed
by the state courts.17 The federal court judge, without relinquishing
jurisdiction over the suit, declined to rule on the case until the state
courts had determined: (1) the relationship between the public trust
doctrine and the California water rights system and (2) whether
plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies
before the water board."8
Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a new complaint in the Superior
Court of Alpine County, where the court entered summary judgment
against them." The Superior Court held that the public trust doc-
trine provided no grounds to attack DWP's board-granted water
rights. The court further ruled that the California water rights sys-
tem was comprehensive, and that any attempt to challenge the city's
water rights had to be made first to the Water Board."0
Plaintiffs then petitioned for a writ of mandamus with the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. The court issued the alternative writ because
of the importance of the issues presented." Justice Broussard, writ-
ing for the majority in this five-one opinion,"" held that plaintiffs
could rely on the public trust doctrine in challenging the allocations
13. Id. See generally Hoff, The Legal Battle Over Mono Lake, CAL. LAW., Jan., 1982,
at 28.
14. 33 Cal. 3d at 431, 658 P.2d at 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 431-32, 658 P.2d at 717, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
19. Id. at 432-33, 658 P.2d at 717-18, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
20. Id. at 433, 658 P.2d at 718, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
21. Id. at 433, 658 P.2d at 718, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
22. Chief Justice Bird and Justices Mosk, Kaus, and Reynoso concurred in Justice
Broussard's opinion; a separate concurring opinion was written by Justice Kaus. A separate
concurring and dissenting opinion was written by Justice Richardson.
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of the waters of Mono Lake. Concluding that the California water
rights system could not operate independently from the public trust
doctrine, the court held that the state must take the public trust into
account when allocating its water resources. The court emphasized
that this duty is a continuous one and includes the reconsideration of
past allocation decisions, even if environmental concerns were consid-
ered in the initial hearing process."
In acknowledging the relationship between the public trust and
the California water rights system, the court rejected plaintiff's argu-
ment that the public trust supercedes statutory water rights, and that
state-granted water rights which impair public trust uses are inva-
lid." Similarly, the court rejected defendant's contention that the
water rights system has preempted the common law public trust doc-
trine, and that water rights granted under that system may not be
reconsidered." Justice Broussard explained that favoring one doc-
trine to the exclusion of the other would create an unbalanced struc-
ture, one which would treat appropriations essential to the economic
development of the state as violative of the public trust, or alterna-
tively preclude any consideration of the public's environmental
concerns.2'
The court first determined that Mono Lake is protected by the
public trust doctrine by examining the purpose and scope of the doc-
trine. The court recognized that the original purpose of the doctrine
was to protect the public's use of waterways for navigation, com-
merce and fishing.17 However, the court acknowledged that the uses
protected by the public trust have been expanded as the public's uses
of California's waterways have changed. The court held that the
public's uses of Mono Lake are protected under the expanded view
of public trust uses set forth in Marks v. Whitney.' In Marks, the
California Supreme Court concluded that changing public need de-
manded a broader definition of the uses protected by the public trust.
Building upon Marks, the court in National Audubon Society em-
phasized that the trust protected recreational uses of navigable wa-
terways, and that the preservation of waterways in their present en-
vironmental state is one of the most important uses protected by the
23. 33 Cal. 3d at 445-47, 658 P.2d at 727-29, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363-65.
24. Id. at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
28. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
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trust.29
The court acknowledged that because the lakes, beds, and
shores of Mono Lake are navigable waterways, they are protected by
the traditional scope of the common law public trust doctrine.80 The
tourt then considered whether the nonnavigable tributaries of Mono
Lake diverted by Los Angeles are also within the scope of the doc-
trine. The court relied on prior California decisions3' which prohib-
ited the use of nonnavigable tributaries in ways that affect the public
trust uses of navigable waterways, and held that:
[T~he principles recognized by those decisions apply fully to a
case in which diversions from a nonnavigable tributary impair
the public trust in a downstream river or lake. 'If the public
trust doctrine applies to constrain fills which destroy navigation
and other public trust uses in navigable waters, it should
equally apply to constrain the extraction of water that destroys
navigation and other public interests. a3
Therefore, the court concluded that the public trust also "protects
navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of nonnavigable
tributaries." '
The court then considered the state's duties and powers over
lands protected by the public trust. Following the precedent of Illi-
nois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois," the court in National
Audubon Society concluded that the state has a continuing duty to
protect the public interest in its navigable waters. In Illinois, which
the California Supreme Court recognized as the primary authority
on this issue,35 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the right
29. The court said: "[tihe public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently
flexible to encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is not bur-
dened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over another." 33 Cal.
3d at 434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356 (quoting Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d at
259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796).
30. 33 Cal. 3d at 435, 658 P.2d at 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
31. People v. Gold Run D. & M. Co., 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884) (defendants were
enjoined from discharging debris into a nonnavigable stream because it resulted in the debris
being deposited into and impeding the navigability of a navigable stream). People v. Russ, 132
Cal. 102, 64 P. 111 (1901) (holding that if a tributary to a navigable stream is necessary to its
navigability, the owner of such land upon which the tributary is situated has no right to dam it
in order to reclaim his land).
32. 33 Cal. 3d at 436-37, 658 P.2d at 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (quoting Johnson,
Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 233, 257-58
(1980) (emphasis in original)).
33. Id. at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
34. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
35. See City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 119 (1980).
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of the Illinois Legislature to revoke its previous grant of one thou-
sand acres of submerged lands to a private party. The United States
Supreme Court held that the state could not abdicate its power over
lands held in trust for the public, just as it cannot abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government." In National Audubon
Society, the California Supreme Court extended the state's public
trust duty to the distribution of appropriative water rights, and con-
cluded that the state's duty necessarily includes the ability to re-allo-
cate or revoke rights previously granted under the water rights sys-
tem.87 Thus, the court rejected defendant's argument that DWP had
a vested interest in the state-granted water rights which, once
granted, could not be disturbed. The California Supreme Court
stressed that the public trust doctrine bars the DWP from asserting a
vested right to the waters of Mono Lake when such diversions harm
the interests protected by the public trust."
Also rejected were the defendant's contentions that since the
state has the right to choose between competing trust uses, 9 it also
has the right to prefer consumptive uses over instream uses."0 The
court clarified that the "trust uses" protected are the public's actual
uses of the navigable waterway at issue."1 Thus, in the Mono Lake
litigation, the trust uses protected are the public's recreational uses
and environmental enjoyment of the Mono Lake environment; DWP
could not claim to be promoting public trust uses by providing water
to Los Angeles for domestic use. In limiting the scope of trust uses in
this way, the court made it clear that the state's duty to protect the
public trust cannot be satisfied merely by allowing the use of public
property for public purposes;" rather, the state must protect the
public's right to stable streams, lakes and tidelands.""
Finally, the court addressed the second question raised by the
federal district court: did plaintiffs have to exhaust all administrative
remedies? While acknowledging that plaintiffs possessed a remedy
36. 146 U.S. at 453.
37. 33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
38. Id. at 426, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
39. See, e.g., Colberg, Inc. v. California ex. rel. Dept. of Public Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408,
432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967); County of Orange v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694, 106
Cal. Rptr. 825 (1973).
40. 33 Cal. 3d at 440, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360, modified, 33 Cal. 3d at
726b, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. 360.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 441, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
43. Id.
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before the Water Board," the court concluded that plaintiffs were
not required to pursue this remedy prior to filing suit. Noting that
the legislature had provided a statutory method for "reconciling
board expertise and judicial precedent,"' 6 the court upheld its prior
decision 46 granting the courts concurrent jurisdiction with the water
board for the determination of water rights issues.4
Justice Richardson dissented only from that part of the major-
ity's opinion which granted concurrent jurisdiction to the Water
Board and the California courts.' Justice Richardson would have
granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Water Board in this instance
because the complex issues required the high level of expertise which
only the Water Board possessed."
National Audubon Society is a novel case in its extension of the
public trust doctrine. Never before has the public trust doctrine been
used to prevent diversions of water that interfere with instream pub-
lic trust uses. In the past state water rights laws have provided the
exclusive basis for allocation of water rights. Traditionally, it was
assumed that once granted, these rights were virtually unadjustable
44. We therefore construe Water Code section 2501 to permit a person claiming
that a use of water is harmful to interests protected by the public trust to seek a
board determination of the allocation of water in a stream system, a determina-
tion which may include reconsideration of rights previously granted in that sys-
tem. Under this interpretation of section 2501, plaintiffs have a remedy before
the Water Board.
33 Cal. 3d at 449, 658 P.2d at 730, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
45. The court said:
Water Code section 2000 provides that "[i]n any suit brought in any court
of competent jurisdiction in this State for determination of rights to water, the
court may order a reference to the board, as referee, of any or all issues involved
in the suit." Section 2001 provides alternatively "the court may refer the suit to
the board for investigation of and report upon any or all of the physical facts
involved." Finally, recognizing that some water cases will be filed in or trans-
ferred to federal courts, section 2075 provides that "[in case suit is brought in a
federal court for determination of the rights to water within, or partially within,
this State, the board may accept a reference of such suit as master or referee for
the court."
Id. at 451, 658 P.2d at 731, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (quoting CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000,
2001, 2075 (West 1971)).
46. Environmental Defense Fund Inc., v. East Bay Municipal Utility Dist., 26 Cal. 3d
183, 605 P.2d 1, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1980).
47. The court said: "[alpart from overriding considerations such as are presented by
health and safety dangers ... we are satisfied that the courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
... administrative agencies .... ." 33 Cal. 3d at 450, 658 P.2d at 731, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368
(quoting Environmental Defense Fund Inc., 26 Cal. 3d at 200, 605 P.2d at 10, 161 Cal. Rptr.
at 475).
48. 33 Cal. 3d at 453, 658 P.2d at 733, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (Richardson, J.
dissenting).
49. Id. at 454, 658 P.2d at 735, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
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and irrevocable, regardless of their environmental consequences. The
public trust has been expanding in recent years to include the protec-
tion of "in-place" water uses such as recreation, wildlife preservation
and ecological quality.50 Yet, until National Audubon Society, it was
uncertain whether the doctrine was strong enough to provide an in-
dependent challenge to diversionary water uses found reasonable by
the state's Water Board. As recognized by the California Supreme
Court in National Audubon Society, since the expansion of the pub-
lic trust's protection asserted in Marks, the "two systems of legal
thought have been on a collision course."6
The supreme court recognized that the two legal doctrines had
developed independently. The public trust was advanced from com-
mon law to protect the interests of the general public in its use of
navigable waters against interference by the private sector.52 In con-
trast, the water rights system has promoted private consumptive use,
with its major criteria that water use be "reasonable and benefi-
cial."" By holding that the public trust must be considered when
granting appropriative water rights, the California Supreme Court
clearly dictated that the California water rights system would now
depend upon both legal doctrines. Thus, regardless of their reasona-
bleness, water rights are still subject to challenge under public trust
principles.
The court was concerned that no decision-making body had
ever balanced the benefit of Los Angeles in its use of the diverted
water against the environmental harm inflicted upon Mono Lake."
The court indicated that DWP had acquired its diversionary rights
from a water board which erroneously believed it lacked the power
and the duty to protect the Mono Lake environment.55 As clarifica-
tion, the court stated that the state not only has the duty to take the
public trust into account when allocating water rights, but also has
the power to reconsider decisions which may be incorrect in light of
changing facts or public needs. Consequently, a party cannot claim a
50. See supra notes 28, 29.
51. 33 Cal. 3d at 425, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
52. People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 116 Cal. 397, 48 P.374 (1897) (depositing debris in
river that obstructs public instream use violates public rights); People v. Gold Run Ditch &
Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884) (defendant's deposits of mining debris were unau-
thorized impairment of public right of navigation); People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App.
3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971) (fencing off a stream from the public inconsistent with
public trust protection).
53. See supra note 3.
54. 33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
55. Id.
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vested right to water which precludes recognition of the public
trust."
National Audubon Society suggests that water rights related to
navigable waters in California, previously thought immutable, can
now be challenged by persons claiming violation of the public trust.
But, while the California Supreme Court provided environmentalists
with a tool to challenge board-granted water rights, the court did not
necessarily give environmentalists the strength to defeat those ex-
isting rights. While the court emphasized the state's duty to consider
public trust values in its water resource planning and to protect the
public trust whenever feasible, 57 the justices cushioned the poten-
tially disrupting impact of this duty on California water rights by
reaffirming the state's power to grant diversionary water rights even
if the diversion "does not promote, and may unavoidably harm, the
trust uses at the source stream.""6 Thus, while the court ensured
that the public trust would be considered, it clarified that diversions
which harm the envionment may be valid despite the public trust in
times of water scarcity.66 To support its conclusion, the court noted
that since industry, agriculture, and cities have developed in reliance
upon appropriated water, "it would be disingenuous to hold that
such appropriations are and have always been improper to the ex-
tent that they harm public trust uses." 60 Consequently, the stability
of present California water rights is uncertain. 1
On remand, the federal district court will have to reach a com-
promise between the competing demands of Los Angeles and Mono
Lake for water. The California Supreme Court in National Audu-
bon Society suggested that those interests could be balanced, perhaps
by reducing the amount of water allocated to Los Angeles. Yet,
while the court may have indicated a desirable compromise, it did
not set a clear judicial precedent for future court decisions. By at-
tempting to reconcile the public trust with appropriative water
rights, the court protected neither interest at the expense of the
56. Id. at 440, 658 P.2d 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360, modified, 33 Cal. 3d at 726a, 658
P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. 360.
57. Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
58. Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. A representative of the California Water Resources Control Board has stated that,
at the present time, the board has no intention of re-evaluating presently appropriated water
rights. Thus, any re-evaluation will have to come from challenges to those present appropria-
tive rights from the public. Address by Roger Johnson, Santa Clara University Water Law
Class (Sept. 13, 1983).
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other. Lower courts in the future faced with judicial review of ap-
propriative water rights must balance developmental needs against
environmental interests. Yet, while it is clear that the trial judge
must ensure that the public trust is considered, he/she is given no
guidance as to how much weight to give public trust values over
reasonable and beneficial uses of water." With no a priori weight
given to public trust protections, a balancing test may realistically
prove nothing more than a procedural check that the Water Board
has made a good faith consideration of the effects of the appropria-
tive water right on the public trust use being protected.
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court in National Audu-
bon Society made a fundamental change in the state's water law by
ruling that the public trust may be used to challenge licenses and
permits granted under the state's water rights system. Its mandate to
the water board is clear: a determination of the reasonableness of
water use must include a consideration of its interference with public
trust uses.6" Thus, California has ensured that no matter how the
statutory water rights system is altered, the public trust will continue
to be an independent source of protection for the public's environ-
mental concerns.
Jeanne Zolezzi
62. A request for rehearing made by the State of California was denied by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court. The state argued that the court's opinion does not sufficiently explain the
relationship between the two doctrines, nor does it give adequate guidance to the federal dis-
trict court. Fulton, State Asks Justices to Clarify Ruling in Mono Lake Dispute: Water Rights
Dispute, L.A. Daily J., March 7, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
63. See Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and California Water Law: National Au-
dubon Society v. Department of Water and Power, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 653 (1982).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAX DEDUCTION FOR PAR-
ENTS FOR CERTAIN EXPENSES INCURRED IN SEND-
ING THEIR CHILDREN TO SCHOOL DOES NOT VIO-
LATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE-Mueller v. Allen,
103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
In Mueller v. Allen,' certain Minnesota taxpayers challenged a
state statute" which allowed state taxpayers to deduct tuition costs
and other school-related expenses from their state income tax. The
petitioners alleged that this statute, section 290.09(22), violated the
first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution
because it provided financial assistance to sectarian institutions.' The
petitioners brought suit against the Commissioner of the Minnesota
Department of Revenue and the parents who, pursuant to section
290.09(22), received a tax deduction for expenses incurred in send-
ing their children to parochial schools.4
In support of their claim, the petitioners provided statistical evi-
dence which demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of taxpay-
ers who utilize the deduction have dependents attending nonpublic
0 1984 by Randel Mathias
1. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
2. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (Supp. 1982) permits a taxpayer to deduct from his or
her computation of gross income the following:
Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to
exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent
in grades 7 to 12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in
attending an elementary or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Da-
kota, South Dakota, Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may
legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for
profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, "textbooks" shall mean and include
books and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and
secondary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught
in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include
instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doc-
trines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or
worship, nor shall it include such books or materials for, or transportation to,
extracurricular activities including sporting events, musical or dramatic events,
speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar nature.
Id.
3. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981). Among the plaintiffs who
brought the challenge in Mueller, were some who had previously tried and failed in Minne-
sota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978). Id. at 999.
4. 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981).
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schools.' The petitioners' data indicated that over ninety-five percent
of nonpublic school students in Minnesota attended sectarian institu-
tions during the 1979-80 school year.' The petitioners argued that
their evidence proved that the primary effect of the statute was not to
further secular education, but rather to advance religion. The peti-
tioners also contended that the statute lacked a valid secular purpose
and that it led to an impermissible entanglement between church and
state.7
The United States District Court for Minnesota granted the re-
spondents' motion for summary judgment and held that the statute
was neutral on its face and in its application, and that its primary
effect was neither to advance nor inhibit religion.8 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's deci-
sion. The court held that the statute did not violate the establishment
clause of the first amendment.' The appellate court conceded that
the deduction may confer some benefit upon church-affiliated
schools, but nevertheless decided that such benefit was too remote
and incidental to be violative of the constitutional separation of
church and state.10 The court concluded that "there are substantial
benefits flowing to all members of the public," and therefore the
statute was not violative of the first and fourteenth amendment."
In upholding the Minnesota tax statute, the United States Su-
preme Court found that section 290.09(22) satisfied the three-part
establishment clause test as set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman."'
Under the test in Lemon, a legislative enactment is invalid if it does
not have a secular legislative purpose, if its primary effect either ad-
vances or inhibits religion, or if it fosters an excessive government
entanglement with religion.1
5. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1198 (8th Cir. 1982).
6. 676 F.2d at 1198 n.9. The evidence showed that of the total 820,000 elementary and
secondary students in Minnesota, only 90,954 attended nonpublic schools during the 1979-80
school year. Of these 90,954 students, 86,906 attended sectarian schools, thus over 95%.
7. 676 F.2d at 1197.
8. 514 F. Supp. at 1003. In an earlier suit the same statute withstood a similar constitu-
tional attack before a three-judge court. See Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452
F. Supp. 1316, 1322 (D. Minn. 1978).
9. 676 F.2d at 1206.
10. Id. at 1205-06.
11. 676 F.2d at 1205. The First Circuit in Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v.
Norberg, 630 F.2d 855, 857 (1st Cir. 1980), invalidated a statute almost identical to the one in
Mueller. To resolve this conflict between circuits, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Mueller. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 48 (1982).
12. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
13. Id. Failure to satisfy any one of the three elements of the test renders the legislation
unconstitutional.
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 14 found that the
statute had a valid secular purpose. He acknowledged that a state's
decision to lessen the burden of educational costs incurred by parents
served the secular purpose of educating the state's citizenry." In ad-
dition, he noted that Minnesota had a strong public interest in assur-
ing the continuity of private schools; these schools indirectly benefit
all taxpayers by easing the burden on the public school system since
fewer students will attend public schools."'
The Court then focused on the primary effect analysis of the
Lemon test. First, the Court distinguished Mueller from Committee
of Education v. Nyquist? in that section 290.09(22) allows all par-
ents incurring educational expenses on behalf of their children to
claim a tax deduction for such expenditures."8 In Nyquist, the statute
provided tax benefits for educational expenses to those parents whose
children attended nonpublic schools." In Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion, this distinction prevented section 290.09(22) from being "sub-
ject[ed] to challenge under the Establishment Clause" because the
statute in Mueller provided state benefits to a "broad spectrum" of
taxpayers instead of a narrow class.20
Justice Rehnquist also distinguished Nyquist on the grounds
that the statute in that case involved a program whereby the amount
deducted was unrelated to the tuition expense incurred by parents on
behalf of their children."1 The Court found that the Minnesota pro-
gram embodied more of a "genuine tax deduction" because it al-
However, in applying this test, Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion in Muel-
ler, stated that although the Lemon test "is well settled, our cases have also emphasized that it
provides 'no more than [a] helpful signpost' in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges."
103 S. Ct. at 3066 (1983) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
14. The majority opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Blackmun and Stevens, dissented.
15. 103 S. Ct. at 3066.
16. Id. Justice Rehnquist also noted that the lack of an express statement of legislative
purpose did not affect the constitutionality of the statute. He stated that prior decisions re-
flected the Court's "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states, particularly
when a [valid] purpose ... may be discerned from the face of the statute." Id. Therefore, in
the case at bar, the Court's discernment of a valid purpose from the face of the statute over-
came the absence of an express statement of purpose.
17. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). The petitioners in Mueller relied heavily upon the Court's
decision in Nyquist. In Nyquist, the Court found as unconstitutional a tax benefit statute which
permitted tax deductions, with features of a tax credit, for certain expenses incurred by those
parents sending their children to nonpublic schools. Id.
18. 103 S. Ct. at 3068.
19. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
20. 103 S. Ct. at 3068.
21. Id. at 3067 n.6.
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lowed parents to deduct $500 to $700 on tuition and related educa-
tional expenses actually spent.22 This differed significantly from the
arbitrarily calculated amount deducted in Nyquist which actually re-
sembled a tax credit disguised as a deduction. The statute in Nyquist
provided a formula that calculated the amount to be deducted by
each qualifying taxpayer.2 A genuine tax deduction does not involve
pre-determined amounts, but rather reduces taxable income by ac-
tual expenditures incurred.
The fact that the Minnesota plan more closely reflected a genu-
ine system of tax laws was also relevant since, traditionally, state
legislatures have been afforded great deference in creating classifica-
tions in tax statutes. 4 According to Justice Rehnquist, section
290.09(22) represented one of the many other deductions available
under Minnesota tax laws25 that may substantially benefit religious
institutions." Justice Rehnquist indicated that the holding in Walz
v. Tax Commissioner27 established the proposition that a statute that
substantially benefits a religious institution does not require the con-
clusion that such a statute violates the establishment clause.28 In his
opinion, section 290.09(22) did not deserve different treatment and,
therefore, the state legislature should be "entitled to substantial def-
erence" in enacting tax statutes that may benefit parochial schools."
Another significant factor in the Court's primary effect analysis
was that parents, not the schools themselves, received the tax benefits
granted by the statute.30 Under section 290.09(22), schools received
state funds indirectly as a result of parents choosing to send their
children to private schools.81 Justice Rehnquist stated that "as a re-
sult of decisions of individual parents no 'imprimatur of State ap-
22. Id.
23. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
24. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (1983).
25. Deductions for charitable contributions are allowed under MINN. STAT. § 290.21
(1933); Deductions for medical expenses are allowed under MINN. STAT. § 290.09(10) (1955);
Exemptions from property tax for property used for charitable purposes are allowed under
MINN. STAT. § 272.02 (1943).
26. 103 S. Ct. at 3067.
27. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Walz, the Court upheld a statute that provided tax exemp-
tions to religious organizations for property used solely for religious worship.
28. 103 S. Ct. at 3067 n.5.
29. 103 S. Ct. at 3067.
30. The Nyquist Court had noted that aid disbursed indirectly rather than directly to
the schools is a material consideration in an establishment clause analysis, albeit "only one
among many to be considered." 413 U.S. 756, 781 (1973). Of the most recent cases involving
state aid, only Nyquist invalidated a statute involving indirect aid. The majority in Mueller
distinguished Nyquist on other grounds. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
31. 103 S. Ct. at 3069.
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proval' can be deemed to have been conferred ... on religion [in
general]." ' The Court also recognized that the historical purpose of
the establishment clause did not include the prohibition against at-
tenuated financial benefits indirectly received by private schools
when such benefits are controlled by private choices of individual
parentsa8
In reaching its decision, the majority did not consider the peti-
tioners' statistical evidence which showed that an overwhelming ma-
jority of those claiming the deduction were parents of parochial
school children." The majority stated that "[w]e would be loathe to
adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law
on annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of pri-
vate citizens claimed benefits under the law." 85 The majority noted
that such an approach does not provide the certainty nor the princi-
pled evaluative standards necessary to this field of the law.86
Discussing the final part of the Lemon test, Justice Rehnquist
found only one possible source that could result in state entangle-
ment with religion. The textbook provision of the statute required
state officials to determine whether certain texts could qualify for the
deduction.8" Based upon the decision in Board of Education v. Al-
len,88 however, the Court found that such a determination would not
32. Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981)).
33. 103 S. Ct. at 3069. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970), Justice
Harlan, in a concurring opinion, explained the evils which the establishment clause was
designed to protect against: "[w]hat is at stake as a matter of policy [in Establishment Clause
cases] is preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as
history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the break-
ing point."
However, the majority in Mueller adopted Justice Powell's views in Walz where he
found the dangers which prompted the Framers to adopt the establishment clause to be remote
in today's society, and furthermore, when weighed against the contributions made by sectarian
schools, such dangers are "entirely tolerable." 103 S. Ct. 3069.
34. See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text. See also 103 S. Ct. at 3070.
35. 103 S. Ct. at 3070.
36. Id. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that any unequal effect resulting from the stat-
ute would be equalized by the contributions conferred upon the state and its taxpayers by the
parents of children attending private schools. Contributions which Rehnquist considered as
important were the educational alternatives parochial schools offered and the wholesome com-
petition resulting with the public schools. The majority made it clear that in light of these
factors the Court would not "engage in [an] empirical inquiry ... which petitioners urge."
Id.
37. Id. In relying on Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) and Everson v.
Board of Educ. 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court held that the textbook and transportation provi-
sions of the statute were constitutional. These cases had been distinguished in Nyquist because
the statutes at issue in Allen and Everson applied to a broad class of taxpayers, namely all
parents and school children. 103 S. Ct. at 3070 n.10.
38. 392 U.S. 236.
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violate the establishment clause. The Allen Court upheld a statute
that provided loans of secular textbooks to parents of children at-
tending nonpublic schools. The program also required state officials
to determine whether the particular books were or were not secular.
The Mueller majority concluded that section 290.09(22) did not "ex-
cessively entangle" the state in religion because it involved no more
state entanglement than that which was upheld in Allen.89 Thus,
having determined that the Minnesota statute satisfied the Lemon
test in its entirety, the Court affirmed the court of appeals decision
by holding that a statute providing all parents of elementary and
secondary school children with a genuine tax deduction for certain
educational expenses incurred does not violate the establishment
clause.
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, found that the statute
violated the establishment clause because section 290.09(22) had the
primary effect of "advancing religion." 0 Justice Marshall inter-
preted the establishment clause as prohibiting a state from providing
any tax benefits which would directly or indirectly aid religious edu-
cation.41 Justice Marshall explained that Nyquist established the
principle that no state may support religious education "either
through direct grants to parochial schools or through financial aid to
parents of parochial school students."' Justice Marshall found no
significant difference between the statute struck down in Nyquist and
the one upheld in Mueller. He noted that both statutes provided tax
deductions, albeit the statute in Nyquist had tax credit characteristics
which had a "direct and immediate effect of advancing religion."' 8
Relying on Nyquist, Justice Marshall also noted that aid in the form
of tuition deductions is prohibited by the establishment clause be-
cause there is no means of insuring that the aid would support only
secular education. 44
Justice Marshall further stated that the majority's attempt to
distinguish Nyquist from Mueller on the ground that the Mueller
statute represented a "genuine tax deduction" was unfounded.45 He
39. 103 S. Ct. at 3071.
40. 103 S. Ct. at 3072 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 3071.
42. Id. at 3072 (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780, 785-86). In Justice Marshall's opinion
it makes no difference whether the aid be for tuition, textbooks, or other instructional materi-
als. If it is used to advance sectarian purposes, then it is prohibited by the establishment clause.
103 S. Ct. at 3072.
43. 103 S. Ct. at 3072 (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783-84).
44. 103 S. Ct. at 3073.
45. Id. at 3075.
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found the form of the aid to be irrelevant because the result of al-
lowing such a tax reduction program, whether in the form of credits
or deductions, is that state taxpayers, in general, pay for parochial
school education."' In addition, he noted the "primary effect" portion
of the Lemon test focused on the "substantive impact" of the aid, not
its form. 7 Therefore, Justice Marshall stated that Minnesota's
"genuine tax deduction" was unconstitutional because the substan-
tive impact of the statute was to assist sectarian schools."8
The dissent asserted that even though the statute on its face ap-
peared to apply to all parents, this simply was not the case. Minne-
sota, by law, cannot charge tuition to those attending public schools.
Accordingly, parents whose children attend public schools are denied
the benefit of deducting the largest educational expense, namely tui-
tion.49 Although textbook and transportation expenses could be
claimed by parents of public school children, Justice Marshall noted
that it was unlikely that $700 worth of supplies and bus fare could
be incurred.50 Therefore, in Justice Marshall's opinion, the statute's
most substantial benefit is available only to parents of children at-
tending nonpublic sectarian schools that charge tuition. 1
The dissent also found that the cases relied upon by the major-
ity, Allen" and Everson, 8 were inapposite because they dealt with
indirectly benefited sectarian schools in which the aid was clearly
restricted to secular functions." Section 290.09(22) was a direct ben-
efit to parochial schools, in the dissent's view, because it conferred
46. Id. at 3073.
47. Id. Justice Marshall referred to prior decisions of the Court that had rejected such
distinctions between tax deductions and tax credits in striking down statutes that provided state
aid to parochial schools. Id. at 3075 n.5. However, those decisions dealt withfixed tax deduc-
tions with no correlation to actual amounts expended or tax credits based upon actual ex-
penses. See Byrne v. Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey, 442 U.S. 907, affg 590
F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979); Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973), affg 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.
Ohio 1972).
48. 103 S. Ct. at 3076 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that "the sub-
stantive impact of the financial support . . . [had] rendered the programs in Nyquist and
Sloan v. Lemon unconstitutional." Id. (citations omitted).
49. 103 S. Ct. at 3074 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 392 U.S. 236.
53. 330 U.S. 1.
54. 103 S. Ct. at 3076 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall distinguished these
two cases as they had been distinguished in Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781-82, and Sloan, 413 U.S.
at 832. 103 S. Ct. at 3076. The Court in Nyquist and Sloan held that Allen provided indirect
assistance which was restricted to the secular side of parochial schools. The financial assistance
provided in Nyquist and Sloan was not restricted to secular functions. Id.
1984]
236 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24
benefits only upon parents of parochial school children. However,
the benefits under scrutiny in Allen and Everson were merely indi-
rect and incidental benefits available to all parents of school children.
Justice Marshall noted that the direct benefit in Mueller, unlike the
aid in Allen and Everson, could not be restricted to secular functions
of parochial schools.55
During the last thirty-five years, the United States Supreme
Court has labored to formulate principles and guidelines to deter-
mine the constitutionality of state programs, like the one in Mueller,
challenged under the establishment clause. 6 In the early cases re-
garding governmental aid to sectarian schools, most notably Ever-
son 57 and Allen,58 the Court focused on the purpose and primary
effect of the enactment. These cases established that a statute with a
valid secular purpose granting aid directly to parents or school chil-
dren is constitutional because the effect on religion is indirect and
incidental."
The Court next added another factor to be considered when re-
viewing challenges under the establishment clause. In Walz v. Tax
Commissioner,60 the Court determined that state and federal govern-
ments must avoid excessive entanglement with religion in order to
comply with the neutrality requirement of the establishment
clause.6 ' The Court in Walz stated that the nature of the aid, as well
as the form it takes, determines whether the resulting involvement
between church and state is permissible.6 This concept was further
55. 103 S. Ct. at 3076 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. In Everson, the Supreme Court defined the establishment clause for the first time
and noted that the government could not set up a church or otherwise aid religion. 330 U.S. 1,
15-16. For other programs upheld by the Supreme Court, see Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (direct reimbursement to sectarian schools for
maintaining state mandated attendance records and administering and grading state prepared
tests); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (reimbursement to schools for carrying out
standardized testing and scoring services, on-premises diagnostic services, and off-premises
therapeutic services); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (loans of secular textbooks
to nonpublic school children); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (provision of
transportation of nonpublic school children to and from school).
57. 330 U.S. 1.
58. 392 U.S. 236.
59. This proposition of indirect aid to parents of school children was accepted by the
Court when it recognized that these cases could become a "platform for yet further steps."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971).
60. 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (statute allowing property tax exemptions for religious institu-
tions upheld as constitutional).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 674-75.
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developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman" in which the Court set forth the
test as it stands today." Lemon invalidated a state subsidy of paro-
chial school teachers' salaries, holding that the requirement of the
state to engage in investigations to classify school activities as either
religious or secular excessively entangles government with religion."
Of the cases that followed Lemon," Committee for Public Edu-
cation v. Nyquist7 most closely resembles the challenged program in
Mueller. Nyquist represented an attempt by the state of New York
to aid nonpublic schools by granting a tax deduction for tuition costs
incurred by parents sending their children to those schools. Prior to
Nyquist, attempts by states to provide such tuition benefits had taken
the form of direct grants" or tax credits. 9 These attempts were held
to be unconstitutional. However, the program in Nyquist offered a
tax deduction based on a statutorily determined amount depending
on the taxpayer's income.70 The Court had difficulty categorizing the
benefit as either a credit or a deduction. Although the statute in form
allowed a deduction, it was struck down because it operated like a
credit.71 The Court in Nyquist left unanswered the question of
whether "a genuine tax deduction, such as for charitable contribu-
tions . . . [would be] constitutionally acceptable."
The Mueller statute presented a combination of elements which
had never been before the Court in the area of state school-aid cases.
It not only granted benefits in the form of genuine tax deductions,
but also made them available to a facially broad class of recipients.
The statute in Nyquist had none of these features. It applied only to
parents of nonpublic school children and offered a tax deduction that
63. 403 U.S. 603.
64. See supra notes 12 and 13 and accompanying text.
65. 403 U.S. at 620-21.
66. Since Lemon, the Court has ruled on many state laws aiding elementary and second-
ary parochial schools. For some of the programs struck down, see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977) (program providing field trip transportation benefits); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975) (direct loans by state to nonpublic schools of instructional materials and equip-
ment); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (direct reimbursment by state to parents of chil-
dren attending nonpublic schools for tuition costs). See supra note 56 for those programs up-
held since Lemon.
67. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
68. See Sloan, 413 U.S. at 828 (1973).
69. See Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (invalidating an Ohio
statute allowing a tax credit for tuition to nonpublic schools).
70. 413 U.S. at 765-66.
71. Id. at 790 n.49. The Court in Nyquist left unanswered the question of whether a
program that provided a "genuine tax deduction, such as for charitable contributions . . . is
constitutionally acceptable." Id.
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operated as a credit. 7' The majority in Mueller, as a result, had no
difficulty in distinguishing the Minnesota statute from the one in
Nyquist. 7 ' Focusing on the primary effect of section 290.09(22), Jus-
tice Rehnquist determined that it was unnecessary to look beyond
the face of the statute since it provided relief to all parents of Min-
nesota school children.7 4 In his view, the statute's primary effect was
to promote education for all schools, not merely for those of a secta-
rian nature.7 5 Such an analysis76 was used in Everson 7 and Allen,78
the only other Supreme Court cases in which states granted benefits
facially to all parents and children. However, later cases suggest that
this approach is questionable.7
The Mueller decision seems to reflect the Supreme Court's
changing attitude toward establishment clause cases. The Court ap-
pears willing to uphold facially neutral statutes even though these
statutes may excessively entangle government with religion or may
have the primary effect of advancing religious education. Further,
the Mueller Court considered the form of the aid important al-
though, in effect, the statute was no different from unconstitutional
provisions previously struck down.
In previous establishment clause cases, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the actual impact of a challenged statute relevant in its pri-
mary effect analysis. In Wolman v. Walter,"0 the Court stated that
in future cases the Allen "exten[sion of] presum[ed] neutrality to
other items" based upon facially neutral statutes would be de-
clined. 1 It follows, then, that cases involving tuition or transporta-
tion provisions should not be afforded a de jure treatment. Further-
more, the Court in Nyquist had stated that Everson and Allen
"make clear that [these cases are] far from providing a per se immu-
nity from examination of the substance of the state's program.""
As the First Circuit asserted in Rhode Island Federation of
72. See supra text accompanying notes 17 and 71.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
75. 103 S. Ct. at 3070-71.
76. This type of an analysis, looking only at the face of the statute, is commonly referred
to as a de jure analysis.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
79. In Wolman v. Walter, the Court concluded that although Allen remained law, it
was only followed as a matter of stare decisis in cases involving textbook provisions. 433 U.S.
229, 252 n.18 (1977).
80. 433 U.S. 229.
81. Id. at 252 n.18.
82. 413 U.S. at 781.
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Teachers v. Norberg,8" disregarding a factual inquiry will lead to
unconstitutional "window dressing" statutes as states will simply en-
act legislation which appears on the face to benefit a broad class."
The Mueller dissent noted that it is unlikely that any court could
find a primary effect of advancing religion under such circum-
stances.85 Therefore, in order to adequately review legislation chal-
lenged under the establishment clause, a factual or statistical inquiry
into the actual breadth of the benefited class should be made."
The result of such an inquiry is the determination that the fact
that section 290.09(22) facially applied to parents whose children at-
tended public schools is of little practical significance. Because public
schools in Minnesota do not charge tuition, the majority of parents
whose children attend those schools can only deduct minimal ex-
penses for such items as pencils, notebooks, and gym clothes. Thus,
the substantial benefit of this statute, deductions for tuition pay-
ments, flows to the parents of children attending nonpublic schools.
As noted by Justice Marshall in Mueller, the only factual inquiry
necessary in determining this effect is whether the program "primar-
ily benefits those who send their children to [parochial] schools."8 It
was undisputed in Mueller that over ninety percent of the tuition-
charging schools in Minnesota were of a sectarian nature." Simi-
larly, in the majority of cases holding that tax credits or deductions
for educational expenses are unconstitutional, the courts have found
that most of the qualifying schools under the program were secta-
rian.8" Therefore, it follows that a statute such as section 290.09(22)
cannot avoid primarily benefiting religious institutions.
In Mueller the Court also stressed that the Minnesota statute
differed from the one in Nyquist because section 290.09(22) provided
83. 630 F.2d 855 (1980).
84. Id.
85. 103 S. Ct. at 3075 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. This type of an analysis, involving a factual or statistical inquiry, is commonly re-
ferred to as a de facto analysis.
87. 103 S. Ct. at 3074 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The same inquiry was made in Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 (1973) and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825, 829 (1973).
88. 103 S. Ct. at 3075.
89. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 768 (1973) (85% of
eligible New York schools were sectarian); Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630
F.2d 855, 859 (1st Cir. 1980) (94% of eligible Rhode Island schools were sectarian); Public
Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514, 516 (3d Cir. 1979) (95% of eligible New
Jersey schools were sectarian); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 748 n.1 (S.D. Ohio
1972) (98% of eligible Ohio schools were sectarian).
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a "genuine tax deduction." ''" The majority's rationale behind this
distinction was that a true tax deduction, as opposed to a tax credit,
is constitutional because it is related to actual expenditures in-
curred. 1 However, this is a misconception because tax credits can
also relate to, and be determined by, actual expenditures. Moreover,
the Court in Grit v. Wolman" summarily affirmed a decision which
invalidated a system of tax credits based upon the amount of tuition
paid by parents of nonpublic school children." This decision oper-
ates against any distinction which regards the form of the aid as
constitutional merely because it is related to actual costs incurred.
Furthermore, the difference between a tax credit and a tax deduction
is only one of degree. A tax credit directly reduces the amount of tax
due, while a tax deduction reduces the taxable base which indirectly
decreases the tax due. However, both still result in some benefit to
qualifying taxpayers because the net result is a reduction in the tax
due.
If the benefited class of the statute consists predominantly of
parents whose children attend sectarian schools, then even these "in-
direct" benefits generated by "genuine tax deductions" flow to reli-
gious institutions. This is prohibited by the establishment clause be-
cause, whether direct or indirect, the principle of neutrality between
church and state forbids state subsidization of religious education.
Therefore, a distinction between a "genuine tax deduction" and a
tax credit should not be made because both have the end result of
providing parents with a financial incentive to send their children to
sectarian schools. This unmistakably provides support to these
schools, which was held by Nyquist as impermissible."
Even if the statute in Mueller could be validly distinguished
from the one in Nyquist, it still violates the establishment clause be-
cause it leads to an excessive entanglement between government and
religion." The dissent in Mueller noted that the Minnesota statute
provided benefits that could not be restricted to the secular functions
90. 103 S. Ct. at 3067-68 n.6.
91. Id.
92. 413 U.S. 901 (1973), affg 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
93. Id. In his dissent, Justice Marshall stated that "[tlhe Court's affirmance of the re-
sult in [this case] was a 'decision on the merits, entitled to precedential weight.' " 103 S. Ct. at
3075-76 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366-67
(1975)).
94. 413 U.S. 756, 783, 786.
95. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The Lemon test requires that each of the
three parts of the test be satisfied.
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of education without excessively entangling government in religion."
This is especially true of the tuition tax benefit because, as a sub-
stantial source of parochial school revenue, these payments support
the schools' total educational program. Because parochial schools
necessarily include religious instruction, it follows that tuition tax
benefits will inevitably support this function. There is no effective
means in which the state can guarantee that these funds will be used
only for secular purposes without extensive involvement with the re-
ligious institution.
The Minnesota statute's textbook provision also leads to exces-
sive entanglement. The Court in Meek v. Pittenger,7 invalidated
loans of "instructional material" to nonpublic schools by reversing
the logic of Allen.98 In Meek, the Court reasoned that the program in
question benefited parochial schools that provided integrated secular
and religious education." The only way to insure that the tax bene-
fits served only the secular function would be to excessively involve
the state in religion. The Minnesota statute deserves no different
treatment under this analysis. It provides tuition and textbook deduc-
tions that also lead to state involvement in religion because the state
must insure that only secular functions are benefited. Accordingly,
the court should have invalidated section 290.09(22) because it failed
to satisfy the third part of the Lemon test.
In Mueller, the Court held that section 290.09(22) did not vio-
late the establishment clause because it did not have the effect of
providing financial assistance to sectarian institutions. Mueller
stands for the proposition that state school-aid statute, neutral on its
face, does not require a scrutiny of its practical effects. The Court's
holding now makes it constitutional for states to support sectarian
schools through tax deduction benefits. To comply with Mueller a
state must simply enact legislation which is neutral on its face and
offers relief in the form of a genuine tax deduction.
Randel Mathias
96. 103 S. Ct. at 3076-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
98. 392 U.S. 236. Allen provided precedent regarding textbook deduction provisions.
The rationale behind [Allen] was that public school authorities prescreened the materials pro-
vided to nonpublic schools which insured that books were of a secular nature. Id.
99. 421 U.S. at 366.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE VETO HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL-Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we can-
not avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment,
and conscientiously to perform our duty."
It was with that seemingly trepid reservation that the United
States Supreme Court sounded the deathknell for the legislative veto
in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.2
A legislative veto is a device that Congress created to review the
application of power that it had previously delegated to the executive
branch and/or its agencies. The veto is usually in the form of "a
statutory provision that delays an announced administrative [agency]
action, usually for a specified number of days, during which time
Congress may vote to approve or disapprove the action without fur-
ther presidential involvement."8 Congressional action may take the
form of a one-house veto (by simple resolution), a modified one-
House veto (so called one-and-a-half-House veto), a two-House veto
(by concurrent resolution), a committee veto, or a committee chair-
man's veto.4 Chadha involved the one-House veto provision.
Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian and native of Kenya, was
lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student
visa in 1966. His visa expired in 1972. After attempts to return to
either Kenya or Britain were rebuffed by both governments,6
Chadha applied for United States citizenship. On October 11, 1973,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), an arm of the
Justice Department, instituted deportation proceedings against
Chadha for overstaying his visa.' Pursuant to section 242(b) of the
0 1984 by Robert A. Weikert
1. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (1983)
(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404 (1821)).
2. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
3. SuncOMMrrna ON RuLEs OF THE HOUSE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE
LEGISLATIVE VETO 1 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as Studies.]
4. Id.
5. Although Chadha held a British passport, Britain informed him that he would have
to wait a year before being admitted to that country. Kenya refused to admit him because they
felt that he was a "British subject." Anderson, A Foreigner Who Upset U.S. Histoy, TIME,
July 4, 1983, at 14.
6. 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
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Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Act),7 a deportation hear-
ing was held before an immigration judge on January 11, 1974.8
Under the Act, the Attorney General (or other bodies in" conjunction
with him, i.e., the INS), at his (their) discretion, may suspend depor-
tations where the statutory criteria described in section 244(a)(1) of
the Act has been met.9
Although Chadha conceded his deportability under the time
limit provision of his visa, he requested the right, as provided in sec-
tion 244(a)(1) of the Act, to file an application to suspend his depor-
tation. The hearing, having been adjourned until after Chadha filed
the application,. resumed on February 7, 1974, and Chadha's depor-
tation was suspended on June 25, 1974 by the INS.10
Section 244(c)(1) of the Act1" requires that if the Attorney Gen-
eral suspends any deportations under subsection (a), 2 a report of
that suspension shall be submitted to Congress. Then, under section
244(c)(2) of the Act,'$ either House of Congress has the power to
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
8. 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This section provides:
(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his
discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien . . . who applies to
the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and-
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions speci-
fied in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years immediately
preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such period
he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deporta-
tion would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship
of the alien or his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States
or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence[.]
10. In applying the criteria set forth in § 1254(a)(1) (see supra note 9), the immigration
judge reviewed evidence, affidavits, and the results of a character investigation conducted by
the INS, before concluding that Chadha's deportation should be suspended. 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
11. 8 U.S.C. §1254(c)(1) (1976). That section provides:
Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to meet
the requirements of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney General may in
his discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deportation of any alien
is suspended under the provisions of this subsection, a complete and detailed
statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be re-
ported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. Such reports shall
be submitted on the first day of each calendar month in which Congress is in
session.
12. See supra note 9.
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1976). This section, referred to as a legislative (or congres-
sional) veto, provides:
(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this
section-
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"veto" 1 ' the suspension within a specified time period. 5 In this case
Congress was required to act during the session at which the case
was reported or before the close of the following session. Three days
prior to the close of that following session, the House of Representa-
tives passed a resolution overturning the suspension" and ordered
the INS to deport Chadha 1 7 In response to this order, the.immigra-
tion judge reopened the deportation hearing." However, Chadha
motioned for a termination of the proceedings on the grounds that
the legislative veto provision of the Act, section 244(c)(2), was un-
constitutional.' Because the immigration judge held that he had no
authority to rule on the constitutional validity of section 244(c)(2),
Chadha was ordered deported on November 8, 1976.20
In an appeal of this order to the Board of Immigration Appeals,
Chadha again maintained that section 244(c)(2) of the Act was un-
if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the
close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is
reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution
stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the
Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's vol-
untary departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in the man-
ner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor
the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General
shall cancel deportation proceedings.
See infra note 14.
14. Although the term "veto" is most commonly associated with the presidential veto
provision of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, provisions like § 1254(c)(2) have become known as
"legislative vetoes." See supra note 13. See also INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2771 n.2.
15. See supra note 13.
16. 103 S. Ct. at 2772 (citing H.R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC.
40800 (1975)).
17. The circumstances surrounding passage of this resolution are somewhat of a mys-
tery, and apparently a subject of irritation with the Supreme Court. 103 S. Ct. at 2771, 2771
n.3, 2772. Representative Eilberg, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration,
Citizenship, and International Law, introduced the resolution which opposed suspending the
deportation of Chadha and six others. Id. at 2771 (citing H.R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
121 CONG. REc. 40247 (1975)). Coincidentally, Rep. Eilberg had introduced a similar bill one
year earlier, disapproving the Attorney General's decision to suspend six other aliens' deporta-
tion. Id. (citing H.R. Res. 1518, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 120 CONG. REC. 41412 (1974)).
The court noted, in response to Resolution 926, that "[tihe resolution had not been
printed and was not made available to other Members of the House prior to or at the time it
was voted on. . . .The Resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote." Id. at 2771
n.3. Sharing the Court's sentiment, one commentator noted, "[A] single chamber, mindlessly
following a single committee chairman, overturned the Justice Department's grant of a hard-
ship suspension." L.A. Daily J., June 28, 1983, § 1, at 4, col. 2. See infra note 97 and
accompanying text.
18. 103 S. Ct. at 2772.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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constitutional. The Board, however, held that it also had no author-
ity to render a ruling on the constitutionality of the provision."1
Thus, Chadha filed a petition for review of the deportation order in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit." Al-
though Chadha's action was against the INS, the INS shared
Chadha's view that section 244(c)(2) of the Act was unconstitutional.
Based on the separation of powers doctrine," the court of appeals
found section 244(c)(2) of the Act unconstitutional and directed the
Attorney General to terminate deportation of Chadha."s
Because, absent the Ninth Circuit's ruling, deportation would
have proceeded against Chadha, the INS appealed the court of ap-
peals decision to the United States Supreme Court.'" The Supreme
Court affirmed the court of appeals opinion and held section
244(c)(2) of the Act unconstitutional."" Before the Court could ad-
dress the constitutionality of the legislative veto, however, it evalu-
ated the merit of several procedural questions involving its jurisdic-
tion and the suitability of the parties before it.
21. Id.
22. Pursuant to § 106(a) of the Act, a petition for review of a deportation order may be
filed in a United States Court of Appeals having appropriate jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Recognizing the importance of the questions presented by the action, the Court of Appeals
invited both the Senate and House of Representatives to file briefs amici curiae. The Houses of
Congress also filed motions to intervene, and these motions were granted. See infra notes 30-
33 and accompanying text. See also 103 S. Ct. at 2773 n.5.
23. 103 S. Ct. at 2772. See also infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
24. 103 S. Ct. at 2772 (citing Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 634
F.2d 408, 436 (9th Cir. 1980), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983)).
25. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. See also 103 S. Ct. at 2773-74. After
Congress's motions to intervene were granted (see supra note 22), both Houses instituted ac-
tions against the INS. Then, while the INS appeal was being taken to the Supreme Court,
Congress petitioned for writs of certiorari. 103 S. Ct. at 2772.
These actions were instituted in response to the INS's decision to appeal the Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding. Apparently, the Senate and House of Representatives wanted to prevent the
INS from appealing that decision, so as not to allow the Supreme Court to make a definitive
ruling on the validity of the legislative veto. Indeed, both Houses motioned to have the Court
dismiss the INS appeal on appellate jurisdictional grounds. See 103 S. Ct. at 2773.
The Supreme Court granted Congress's petition for writs of certiorari (United States
House of Representatives v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, cert. granted, 454 U.S. 812 (1981), and
United States Senate v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, cert. granted , 454 U.S. 812 (1981)), but post-
poned consideration of Chadha's case. INS v. Chadha, 454 U.S. 812 (1981). Finally, after
twice hearing oral argument (February 22, 1982 and reargued, October 7, 1982), the Court
affirmed the court of appeals decision. 103 S. Ct. at 2788.
26. 103 S. Ct. at 2788.
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A. Procedural Questions27
1. Appellate Jurisdiction
The parties in intervention, both Houses of Congress, chal-
lenged the appellate jurisdiction of the Court in this action pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. section 1252,"8 which sets forth the criteria for an ap-
peal to the United States Supreme Court. They also moved to dis-
miss the INS appeal on the basis of the Court's statement in Deposit
Guaranty National Bank v. Roper." While the Court had little
trouble in finding jurisdiction under section 1252,30 the logic used in
defense of Congress's motion to dismiss was conceptually more com-
plicated. In Deposit Guaranty, the Court stated that "[a] party who
receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judg-
ment affording relief and cannot appeal from it.".. 1 Since the INS
also alleged that section 244(c)(2) of the Act was unconstitutional, it
was arguable that the INS has been granted all that they generally
sought in the court of appeals's decision, and thus under Deposit
Guaranty, had no basis for an appeal. However, the Court reasoned
that because the INS had concluded that it had no power to rule on
the constitutionality of section 244(c)(2) of the Act prior to Chadha's
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the INS had no choice but to implement
the deportation order pursuant to the House's resolution.32 Thus,
because the INS was responsible for the implementation of that or-
der, the INS was prohibited from taking action it would otherwise
have taken pursuant to the Attorney General's decision to suspend
27. The Court, in addressing these issues, used the following headings: Appellate Juris-
diction, Severability, Standing, Alternative Relief, Jurisdiction, Case or Controversy, and Po-
litical Question. For the sake of simplicity, those same headings will be used in this note.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976). This section provides, in pertinent part:
Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from [a] ...decree or order of
any court of the United States. . .holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional
in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any of its
agencies, or any officer or employee therof, as such officer or employee, is a
party.
29. "A party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judg-
ment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it." 103 S. Ct. at 2772 (quoting Deposit
Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980)).
30. The Court noted in finding all the elements necessary for establishing jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, that the Court of Appeals is a "court of the United States," the
proceeding below was a "civil action, suit or proceeding," the INS is an agency of the United
States and was a party to the proceeding below, and that the lower court proceeding found an
act of Congress unconsituitional. 103 S. Ct. at 2773.
31. 103 S. Ct. at 2773 (quoting Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. at
333).
32. 103 S. Ct. at 2773.
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deportation.8" In light of this prohibition, the Court found the INS
to be sufficiently aggrieved.
2. Severability
Congress also contended that finding the legislative veto provi-
sion unconstitutional would result in the invalidation of the entire
Act. 3' However, the Court noted that the drafters of the legislation
had provided for any severability questions by incorporating a sever-
ability clause into the Act itself." Indeed, the Court found, "Con-
gress could not have more plainly authorized the presumption that
the provision for a one-House veto in section 244(c)(2) is severable
from the remainder of section 244 and the act of which it is a
part."' The Court discovered evidence of similar congressional in-
tent through an evaluation of the legislative history of section 244.11
This history provided further credence for the Court's conclusion
that Congress designed the Act to stand in the event that provisions
were severed. 8
3. Standing
The legitimacy of Chadha's standing was also questioned by
Congress. The Houses argued that if Chadha were to prevail, he
would receive no real relief; the actual consequence of a victory by
Chadha, Congress maintained, would be the advancement of Execu-
tive Branch interests, leading to a separation of powers with Con-
gress." The Court dismissed this assertion, finding that Chadha had
33. Id.
34. This contention sparked one of the dissenting opinions. Justice Rehnquist, in his
dissent, agreed with Congress and would have found § 244(c)(2) inseverable from the rest of §
244. Joined by Justice White, Justice Rehnquist never reached the merits of the case. Rather,
he argued that the veto provision, being inseverable, was evidence of Congress' intent to regu-
late deportations. From an examination of the Act's history, Justice Rehnquist noted that be-
cause Congress had always retained some type of control over Executive Branch decisions to
suspend deportations, it did not intend for the Act to be functional without § 244(c)(2). 103 S.
Ct. at 2816-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Although the presence of the severability clause in the Act would seem to be contrary to
this analysis (see infra notes 35 and 154), the dissent argued that such a clause "does not
conclusively resolve the issue." 103 S. Ct. at 2816 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. 103 S. Ct. at 2774 (construing Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 406, 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (1983)).
36. 103 S. Ct. at 2774.
37. Id. The Court traced the evolution of deportation proceedings from their origin as
private bills enacted by both Houses of Congress and presented to the President, to their pre-
sent stature involving the Attorney General's discretion to suspend. It concluded that the legis-
lative history was not "sufficient to rebut the presumption of sevcrability raised by § 406." Id.
38. See infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
39. 103 S. Ct. at 2776. This contention was also advanced under Congress's severability
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demonstrated injury capable of being redressed through the judicial
relief he sought.'0
4. Alternative Relief
In another procedural challenge, Congress maintained that be-
cause Chadha had alternative forms of statutory relief available to
him,' 1 the Court should not entertain the constitutional question
presented by the case, i.e., the validity of the legislative veto. How-
ever, the uncertainty of these avenues of relief compelled the Court
to reject this assertion.'2 In the Court's view, the fact that Chadha
was being threatened with deportation required that he be granted
the right to challenge the statutory provision responsible for that
threat; moreover, speculative alternative forms of relief would not be
a bar to this right.' 8
5. Jurisdiction
Pursuant to section 106(a) of the Act,"' Chadha was able to,
and did, appeal the INS's deportation order. Congress, however,
challenged the applicability of that section to the case at hand. Sec-
tion 106(a) of the Act provides that a petition for review in the court
of appeals shall be "the sole and exclusive procedure for judicial re-
view of all final orders of deportation . . . made against aliens
challenge. However, this argument, as it would apply to severability, would only have been
valid if the Court were to have found § 244(c)(2) inseverable. Then, the whole Act being
invalid, the Attorney General would have had no authority to suspend Chadha's deportation
under § 244(a)(1), and Chadha would have been deported for overstaying his visa. Thus,
Congress reasoned, if Chadha prevailed in his constitutional attack against § 244(c)(2), he
would still face deportation because the Act would then be invalid. See also id. at 2774 n.7,
2816-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40. 103 S. Ct. at 2776 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978).
41. 103 S. Ct. at 2776. On August 10, 1980, Chadha married a U.S. citizen. At that
point, under §§ 201(b), 204, and 245 of the Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), 1154, 1255 (1976)),
Chadha may have been eligible for permanent residence as an "immediate relative." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151(b) (1976) ("immediate relative" refers to "children, spouses, and parents of a United
States citizen"). The Court noted that Chadha may also have been eligible for asylum under
The Refugee Act of 1980. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1980) (giving the Attorney General authority to
grant asylum and then permanent residency to aliens unable to return home for " fear of
persecution"). 103 S. Ct. at 2776.
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2777. The Court, in relying on a court of appeals decision affirming
the court's discretion in applying §§ 245 and 201(b) of the Act (Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d
1028 (9th Cir. 1979)), stated " It is by no means certain, for example, that Chadha's classifica-
tion as an immediate relative would result in the adjustment of Chadha's status from nonimmi-
grant to permanent resident." 103 S. Ct. at 2777.
43. 103 S. Ct. at 2777.
44. See supra note 22.
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within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings
under section 242(b)"' of this act.""' Congress argued that because
the resolution invoked through section 244(c)(2) of the Act was con-
ducted outside of the hearing (and hence outside of any "administra-
tive proceedings"), section 106(a) of the Act does not "encompass
Chadha's constitutional challenge, 4 7 and as a result, he had no right
to an appeal under the criteria set forth in section 106(a) of the Act.
Thus, Congress maintained that given this analysis, the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not have a basis for taking the case, and consequently any
decision handed down by the court was void for want of jurisdiction.
Although confronted with a contrary interpretation of section
106(a), ' O the Court accepted the Ninth Circuit's construction of "fi-
nal orders" to include "all matters on which the validity of the final
order is contingent." 4  The Court also distinguished its holding in
Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS," stating that unlike petitioner Cheng,
Chadha was directly attacking the deportation order itself. Cheng
had sought relief similar to the deportation order. "'
6. Case or Controversy
Congress also contended that Chadha's action did not present a
genuine case or controversy as required by Article III of the Consti-
tution," but rather it represented "a friendly, non-adversary pro-
ceeding" 6 because both Chadha and the INS were arguing that sec-
tion 244(c)(2) of the Act was unconstitutional. In rejecting this
contention and finding sufficient adversity, the Court adopted gener-
ally the same analysis that it used to dismiss Congress's jurisdiction
attack." The Court also recognized the inherent adversity present as
45. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
46. 103 S. Ct. at 2777 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1981)). See supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
47. 103 S. Ct. at 2777.
48. See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1981).
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2777 (quoting Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 412 (9th Cir. 1981)).
The Court noted that a House resolution led to Chadha's "final order" of deportation. Id.
50. 392 U.S. 206 (1968). The Court in Cheng held that § 106(a) of the Act "embraces
only those determinations made during a proceeding conducted under § 242(b) [of the Act]."
Id. at 216. By implication, this holding would suggest that Chadha was not entitled to an
appeal under § 106(a) of the Act because his constitutional challenge was based on a House
resolution, and not a determination made under § 242(b) of the Act.
51. See 103 S. Ct. at 2777 n.11.
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This section provides that judicial power will only extend
to specified cases or controversies.
53. 103 S. Ct. at 2778 (quoting Aswander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
54. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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a result of Congress's intervention, and noted that Congress was
"both a proper party to defend the constitutionality of section
244(c)(2) [of the Act] and a proper petitioner [for writ of certiorari]
under section 1254(1)." 
7. Political Question
Finally, Congress presented the argument that Chadha was
merely challenging congressional authority under its constitutional
powers," and as a result, the case presented a nonjusticiable political
question. Congress reasoned that actions taken pursuant to those ple-
nary power were nonreviewable as applied to aliens. Although the
Court conceded Congress' plenary power over aliens, its concern was
whether Congress, in exercising that power, violated some other con-
stitutional restriction.67
Relying on the criteria set out in Baker v. Carr" for determin-
ing the presence of a nonjusticiable political question, the Court de-
duced, since Congress had not specified, that the congressional argu-
ment was based on "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."'" In
short, Congress impliedly asserted that Chadha had no grounds for
his action in that the Constitution had granted Congress authority to
enact and implement section 244(c)(2) of the Act. Yet, the Court
pointed out that this analysis would categorize all challenges to the
constituionality of a statute as political questions.6 0 Moreoever, any
challenges to the constitutionality of a statute must be decided by the
55. 103 S. Ct. at 2778. See also 103 S. Ct. at 2774 n.6. The Court pointed out that it
had long been its practice to hold that Congress should defend the validity of a statute when an
agency, like the INS, is a defendent charged with enforcing the statute, but agrees with the
plaintiff as to its constitutional status. 103 S. Ct. at 2778.
56. The powers Congress referred to were the naturalization clause, U.S. CONST. art. I
§ 8, cl. 4, and the necessary and proper clause, id. 8, c. 18. 103 S. Ct. at 2778.
57. 103 'S. Ct. at 2779 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976)).
58. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Baker lists several circumstances under which a political
question may arise. They are:
[a] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non judicial discretion; or the impossibility of
a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the re-
spect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unques-
tioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
Id.
59. 103 S. Ct. at 2779 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217).
60. 103 S. Ct. at 2779.
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courts." While it is true that by its very nature Chadha's assertions
had political implications, the Court, relying on Marbury v.
Madison," concluded that the "presence of constitutional issues with
significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the polit-
ical question doctrine.""'
B. Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto
Having dispensed with these challenges, the Court addressed
the constitutionality of section 244(c)(2) of the Act." The analysis
began with the traditional constitutional law presumption that the
challenged statute is valid. However, the Court noted that the effi-
ciency and convenience of a law or procedure will not justify its exis-
tence if the instrument is not constitutional."' Although acknowledg-
ing Justice White's argument that the one-House veto is a useful
"political invention,"" the Court maintained that even useful "polit-
ical inventions" are required to adhere to the guidelines set forth in
the Constitution.
The crux of the majority opinion" was that the use of a legisla-
tive veto amounted to a legislative act. Because Congress was, in ef-
fect, enacting legislation through the use of veto provisions like sec-
tion 244(c)(2) of the Act," the Court reasoned that that legislation
should be amenable to the same constitutional procedures as any
other legislation passed by Congress; namely, the legislation must be
passed by both Houses of Congress and then presented to the Presi-
dent.70 To the extent that the House's resolution pursuant to section
61. Id.
62. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
63. 103 S. Ct. at 2780.
64. While the Court clearly directs its analysis only towards the one-House veto provi-
sion (throughout the opinion the Court is careful to refer only to the one-House veto), its
constitutional law analysis would seem to invalidate all forms of the legislative veto. See supra
note 4 and accompanying text. See also 103 S. Ct. at 2796 (White, J., dissenting).
65. 103 S. Ct. at 2780-81.
66. Id. at 2781 (quoting 103 S. Ct. at 2795 (White, J., dissenting)).
67. 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
68. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice Powell concurred in the result, but
filed a separate opinion.
69. See supra note 13. Section 244(c)(2) allowed either House of Congress to pass a
resolution overturning the Attorney General's suspension of an alien's deportation. Without
the resolution, Chadha would not have been subject to deportation.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7. Section 1 provides: "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Section 7, c. 2 provides: "Every bill
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes Law,
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244(c)(2) of the Act did not provide for a two-House vote or present-
ment to the President, the Court found the action unconstitutional.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted, "[E]xplicit and
unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the
iespective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the leg-
islative process."'71 The importance of these article I provisions
prompted the Court to break down its initial analysis into two sec-
tions-the presentment clauses, and bicameralism."'
1. The Presentment Clauses
The presentment clauses refer to those constitutional provisions
requiring that all legislation be presented to the President before be-
coming law.78 After noting that the language of those provisons man-
dates adherence to that procedure,7' the Court turned to the history
of the Presentment Clauses. As did the Ninth Circuit,78 the Supreme
Court exhaustively reviewed commentaries espousing the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution.Y In particular, the Court focused
on the role of the presidential veto as a "salutory check upon the
legislative body," necessary for, among other things, the prevention
of collusive action on the part of a majority of that body.77 In addi-
tion, the Court noted that by allowing for the presidential veto, the
Framers insured that the legislative process was subject to review
from a national perspective.7
2. Bicameralism
The Court approached this topic with essentially the same man-
be presented to the President of the United States. .. ."
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary . . . shall be presented to the Presi-
dent of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be ap-
proved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
the Senate and House of Representatives, according to Rules and Limitations
prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3
71. 103 S. Ct. at 2781 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 2782-83.
73. See supra note 70.
74. The Court, in citing these constitutional provisions, emphasized the Framers' use of
the word "shall" (see supra note 70) and construed this usage as definitive proof as to how the
provisions were meant to be applied. 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
75. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
76. 103 S. Ct. at 2782-83.
77. Id. at 2782.
78. Id. The Court relied partly on its decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926). In Myers, the Court upheld the power of the President to appoint and remove execu-
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ner of analysis that it used in discussing the presentment clauses.
After commenting on the unambiguous and positive language of arti-
cle I, sections I and 7 of the Constitution,79 which state that effective
legislation must be passed in both Houses, the Court reviewed the
history of their incorporation into the Constitution. That review be-
gan with the emphasis the Framers gave to insuring that all legisla-
tion be carefully considered by the nation's elected officials, s" and
also the Framers' concern with the adoption of a bicameral system.'"
In short, it was the intention of the Framers to provide for the exer-
cise of legislative power "only after opportunity for full study and
debate in separate settings."' Recognizing the interdependency pro-
moted by the Constitution's system of checks and balances, the Court
concluded in no uncertain terms that the legislative power of the fed-
eral government should be exercised "in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhastively considered procedure.""
3. Separation of Powers
Satisfied with the stringency of these two constitutional man-
dates, the Court proceeded to determine the validity of the legislative
veto in light of them. This analysis was undertaken through the sep-
aration of powers doctrine. The initial presumption was that when
the House of Representatives passed the resolution pursuant to sec-
tion 244(c)(2), it was acting within the sphere of its authority as
granted by the Constitution. However, this presemption was rebut-
ted by the Court's conclusion that the presentment and bicameralism
requirements of article I should have been applied to action taken
under section 244(c)(2).
The test used by the Court to determine whether or not section
244(c)(2) was within the legislative sphere governed by article I was,
tive officials. The Myers holding reflected the Court's strict adherence to constitutional lan-
guage, especially that describing executive branch power: "[Tlhe President [having been)
elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of
either body of the Legislature whose constituencies are local and not countrywide." 103 S. Ct.
at 2782-83 (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 123).
79. See supra note 70.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 2783.
81. Id. The Court quoted several of the Framers' reasons for not adopting a one-House
legislature. This analysis was provoked by the fact that the Court found that the legislative
veto action taken under § 244(c)(2) was similar to action taken under a one-House legislature.
Both procedures, by their very nature, lack bicameral structure. This approach then, would
seem inapplicable to the two-House veto provision. But cf. 103 S. Ct. at 2807-08 (White, J.,
dissenting) (one-House veto more susceptible to validity than two-House veto).
82. 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
83. Id.
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whether action. taken by either House contains matter which should
be regarded as legislative in its "character and effect."" In deciding
that the House action was legislative in its "character and effect,"
the Court found that the resolution had the effect of "altering the
legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legisla-
tive branch.""' Indeed, without the House action, the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision would not have been overruled, and Chadha would
not have been subject to deportation.
The Court also found that the legislative nature of action taken
under section 244(c)(2) was exhibited by the "character of the Con-
gressional action it supplants."" Simply, had the veto provision not
existed, neither House of Congress, short of enacting new legislation,
could have effectively overturned the Attorney General's decision to
suspend Chadha's deportation. Hence, the Court viewed the House's
resolution as an unconstitutional attempt to circumvent the constitu-
tionally prescribed legislative process. Congress, however, attempted
to shift the Court's focus by arguing that if the Court's reasoning
was valid, then the Attorney General, in his decision to suspend de-
portations, should also be amenable to the full bicameral process.
The Court rejected that contention, declaring that "[t]he bicameral
process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration
of the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach beyond
the limits of the statute that created it . . . ." As the Court noted,
the constitutionality of the Attorney General's action under section
244 involves only a delegation question, and merely because Con-
gress is entitled to delegate power to administrative agencies such as
the INS, does not support the argument that Congress has the right
to control administration of agency laws through a legislative veto."
In short, if Congress wanted to overrule the Attorney General's deci-
sion to suspend Chadha's deportation, it would have had to have
passed legislation to that effect through the prescribed bicameral and
presentment process."
84. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897)). It is interesting to
note that for this seemingly important proposition, the Court was unable to find prior case law
to support it.
85. 103 S. Ct. at 2784. Specifically, the Court found the resolution would alter "the
legal rights, duties, and relations" of the Attorney General, Chadha, and Executive Branch
officials. Id.
86. 103 S. Ct. at 2785.
87. Id. at 2785 n.16. The Court also noted that statutes creating the Executive's author-
ity are all "duly enacted pursuant to [airticle I, §§ 1, 7" of the Constitution. Id.
88. 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
89. Congress also argued that the resolution was either amending § 244(a)(1) of the Act
19841
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Finally, the Court pointed out that the Framers, when drafting
the Constitution, clearly did not contemplate the employment of leg-
islative veto provisions. This observation was based on the fact that
the Constitution expressly provided for situations that required only
the action of one House.' Since the one-House veto was not among
those situations, the Court concluded that the veto was unconstitu-
tional."' In reaching this conclusion the Court reasoned that because
the exceptions to the usual bicameral requirements were "narrow,
explicit, and separately justified,"'" not only did they not authorize
the legislative veto's use, but they also provided further support for
the Court's finding that congressional authority in this area could
not be implied."
In sum, having characterized the House's resolution as legisla-
tion, the Court was able to apply bicameral and presentment clause
analysis to find section 244(c)(2) invalid. Simply, the resolution was
unconstitutional because it was neither passed by both Houses of
Congress nor presented to the President for his review. The Supreme
Court recognized that the constitutional requirements for passing
legislation are often cumbersome and time-consuming, but concluded
that "[w]ith all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential
for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom
than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted
restraints spelled out in the Constitution.""
C. Other Opinions
1. Concurring
Justice Powell's concurring opinion" was not necessary for a
majority, but his reasoning provided an interesting approach to the
issue. Justice Powell was concerned over the apparent breadth of the
decision. This breadth, he felt, was achieved as a result of the
as to Chadha, or repealing § 244 as to Chadha. However, as the Court points out, both of
these avenues also require conformity to article I of the Constitution. See 103 S. Ct. at 2785 &
n.18.
90. 103 S. Ct. at 2786. These were the House of Representative's power to impeach,
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 6; and the Senate's power to conduct trials following impeachment,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5, disapprove or approve presidential appointments, U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and to ratify treaties negotiated by the President, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
91. 103 S. Ct. at 2787.
92. Id. See also supra note 90.
93. 103 S. Ct. at 2787.
94. Id. at 2788.
95. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
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Court's reliance on the presentment clauses in reaching its decision.
Thus, Justice Powell would have decided the case on narrower
grounds. Although he too found the veto provision unconstitutional,
he felt that in finding Chadha deportable, the House had "assumed
a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of
powers.""
While conceding the existence of indeterminate boundaries sep-
arating the three branches of our government, Justice Powell found
that the separation of powers doctrine had been violated by the
House's resolution under section 244(c)(2): an action he found on its
face "clearly adjudicatory."'1 7 In particular, he felt that the House
acted as an appellate court in overruling the Attorney General's "ap-
plication of established law to Chadha."'
2. Dissenting
The majority's conclusion and invalidation of the legislative veto
96. Id. at 2789 (Powell, J., concurring). While Justice Powell, like the majority, also
relied on the separation of powers doctrine, his analysis reflected a much narrower application.
The majority found a violation of that doctrine through the failure of § 244(c)(2) of the Act to
provide for presentment of the resolution to the President. Justice Powell, however, was con-
cerned only with the procedures and effects of this particular legislative veto provision because
it allowed one House of Congress, based on the review of statutory criteria, to render a defini-
tive ruling on the issue of an alien's deportability. Thus, under this analysis, not all legislative
vetoes would be invalid; only those found to usurp judicial functions would be susceptible to
revocation. To the extent that the legislative veto, by its very nature, does not require presiden-
tial presentment, the majority's analysis under the separation of powers doctrine is clearly the
more pervasive of the two applications.
Justice Powell's approach resembled that taken by the Ninth Circuit. See infra notes 124-
26 and accompanying text. He relied on historical references exhibiting the Framers' concern
with preventing legislatures from usurping judicial functions, and also, his analysis included
specific Constitutional language such as the bill of attainder clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
3. See also U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (Court construction of bill of attainder clause).
97. 103 S. Ct. at 2791. Justice Powell was especially concerned with the procedure by
which the House passed its resolution pursuant to § 244(c)(2). See supra note 17 and accom-
panying text. He notes that Congress is "not bound by [either] substantive rules" or "proce-
dural safeguards." 103 S. Ct. at 2792. This observation suggests that Justice Powell felt that
some due process issues may also have been at stake in this action. See infra notes 128-29 and
accompanying text.
98. 103 S. Ct. at 2791 n.8. Representative Eilberg, the resolution's sponsor (see supra
note 17), argued that Chadha had not met the statutory requirements for suspension of his
deportation. 103 S. Ct. at 2791. Justice Powell's contention was that this type of decision is
generally one to be made by the courts. Id. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. How-
ever, the majority directly addressed this argument and found Justice Powell's analogy be-
tween judicial action and the one-House veto less than perfect. Id. at 2787 n.21. Although
acknowledging that in a sense action taken pursuant to § 244(c)(2) had a "judicial cast," they
noted that no justiciable case or controversy was presented by the Attorney General's decision
to suspend Chadha's deportation. Id. The Court observed that " 'courts have not been given
the authority to review whether an alien should be given permanent status; review is limited to
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sparked a bitter and lengthy dissent from Justice White." Although
unable to garner any other votes, the opinion presented a compre-
hensive attack on the majority's reasoning.
Justice White's overriding concern was with the magnitude of
the holding. Noting that there are a number of statutory provisions
now endangered by the Court's decision, 100 he also would have de-
cided the case on narrower grounds. '0 In briefly giving the history
of the legislative veto and its current stature, the dissent argued that
empirically both the executive and legislative branches had accepted
the use of the device, and had adjusted to it with minimal disagree-
ment.1 'O Justice White not only termed the legislative veto an "indis-
pensable political invention," but he also regarded it as an effective
mechanism for assuring the "accountability of independent regula-
tory agencies" for preserving Congress's control over lawmaking.10
While the majority viewed the veto provision as a means by which
Congress could overstep its constitutional bounds, Justice White ar-
gued that the veto was, in contrast, a "means of defense" necessary
to Congress in its role as the country's lawmaker. ' " Unlike the ma-
jority, he felt that the Framers would have readily accepted the legis-
lative veto as a necessary consequence of the growing size and com-
plexity of modern government. Because the Constitution was silent
on the issue, Justice White regarded the Court's task as determining
whether the legislative veto was consistent with article I and the sep-
whether the Attorney General has properly applied the statutory standards for' denying a
request for suspension of deportation." Id. at 2787 n.21 (quoting 103 S. Ct. at 2810 (White,
J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original)). Thus, the majority concluded that since the House's
action was not one ordinarily assumed by the courts, the resolution was legislative for all
intents and purposes, and consequently subject to the procedures set out in article 1. Id. at
2787 n.21.
99. After the Court's decision was announced from the bench by Chief Justice Burger,
in a rare occurrence, Justice White read portions of his dissent aloud. In an even "rarer mo-
ment of drama," when Justice White had finished, the Chief Justice responded with an im-
promptu defense of the majority opinion. N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
100. Justice White even went so far as to attach an appendix to his opinion, listing the
affected provisions. 103 S. Ct. at 2811-16 (White, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2792. Justice White suggested that, if possible, the case should only have
been decided on separation of powers grounds, leaving open the constitutionality of other legis-
lative veto provisions. See supra note 64. See also 103 S. Ct. at 2788 (Powell, J., concurring).
Furthermore, Justice White found it regrettable that such a sweeping decision emerged from
such an atypical case. He wrote, "to strike an entire class of statutes based on consideration of
a somewhat atypical and more readily indictable exemplar of this class is irresponsible." Id. at
2796 (White, J., dissenting).
102. See 103 S. Ct. at 2804-07.
103. Id. at 2795.
104. Id. at 2796.
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aration of powers doctrine. In his view, it was clearly consistent.10 5
The dissent agreed with the majority's construction of article I
of the Constitution."" However, Justice White refused to find that
the exercise of the legislative veto by the House of Representives
amounted to new legislation. Rather, he regarded the Attorney Gen-
eral's suspension of Chadha's deportation as an INS proposal for
legislation'" which Congress, in its discretion, can only negate
through its use of section 244(c)(2).108 In effect, his contention was
that Congress does not, in any way, make new law through this ac-
tion.'" Before reaching this conclusion though, Justice White argued
that the Framers, in adopting the presentment clauses, did not intend
for them to be restraints on congressional authority. On the contrary,
he noted that Congress was given expansive lawmaking power, espe-
cially through the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution.11
Thus, he continued, in keeping with the scope of this authority,
Congress has seen fit to delegate legislative authority "to the Execu-
tive branch, to the independent regulatory agencies, and to private
individuals and groups."1 1
Although the Supreme Court initially required this delegation
to be well-defined and delegated under prescribed standards,1 ' the
dissent's position was that the Court has condoned broad and unde-
fined delegations in the past.118 The crux of this argument is that
agencies delegated this power have no choice but to enact rules, reg-
ulations, and other measures to implement this extensively delegated
authority. Justice White argued that these enactments amount to ex-
105. Id. at 2798.
106. Id. at 2799. Justice White found this construction to be a "truismatic exposition"
of the clauses. Id.
107. Essentially, Justice White is arguing that the Attorney General's decision to sus-
pend Chadha's deportation represented only a proposal as to what the Attorney General in-
tended to do. Thus, through the Attorney General's subsequent report to Congress pursuant to
§ 244(c)(1) of the Act, the House had the opportunity to negate that proposal. See supra note
11.
108. 103 S. Ct. at 2799. (White, J., dissenting).
109. Justice White analogized this point with the observation that the President does not
make new law when he exercises the presidential veto power. Id.
110. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316
(1819) (construction of necessary and proper clause).
111. 103 S. Ct. at 2801.
112. J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
113. 103 S. Ct. at 2802. For example, several delegations have provided only that they
be effectuated in the "public interest," or for "public convenience, interest, or necessity." See,
e.g., Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930) ("public interest"); Fed-
eral Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933) ("public
convenience, interest, or necessity").
19841
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
plicit lawmaking,1" but are not susceptible to the legislative proce-
dures required by article I of the Constitution. Thus, he maintains
that without the legislative veto, Congress has no way of checking
that delegation. 5
In his final argument, Justice White reasoned that the nature of
the legislative veto provision satisfies the purpose of the bicameral
and presentment clause requirements. Generalizing, he observed that
the main concern in adopting these requirements was to insure that
any changes in the status quo were made with the approval of both
the President and Congress."' Arguing that that concern is ad-
dressed under the nature and procedure of a legislative veto, he sug-
gested that the Attorney General's recommendation for deportation
suspension represents Executive approval and that Congress's ap-
proval is reflected in its failure to vote.
117
D. The Impact of the Majority Opinion
Prior to Chadha, the legislative veto had played a prominent
role in the relationship between Congress and the Executive Branch.
Since the 1930's, legislative vetoes have been incorporated into nearly
two hundred statutory provisions affecting at least fifty-seven federal
laws."' Veto provisions have been utilized in a variety of statutory
settings, ranging from foreign affairs to energy to international
trade.1 ' With this degree of permeation, one would expect prior
case law to be fairly extensive. However, very few federal courts 20
114. 103 S. Ct. at 2802 (White, J., dissenting).
115. In expressing his concern, Justice White stated, "It is . . . not apparent why the
reservation of a veto over the exercise of that [delegated power] must be subject to a more
exacting test. In both cases, it is enough that the initial statutory authorizations comply with
[a]rticle I requirements." Id.
116. Id. at 2806-08.
117. Id. at 2806. Justice White's analogy, however, does not work as effectively or as
simply if either House decides to express its disapproval, as was the situation in Chadha. As
the majority notes, "IThat approach 'would analogize the effect of one House disapproval to
the failure of one House to vote affirmatively on a private bill.'" Id. at 2787 n.22 (quoting
Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d at 635). Since such action is clearly violative of article I procedures,
the Court maintained that if that interpretation was Congress's intent in enacting § 244(c)(2),
it would amount to "an amending of [Article] I." Id. Continuing, the Court concluded that to
"allow Congress to evade the strictures of the Constitution and in effect enact Executive pro-
posals into law by mere silence cannot be squared with [Article] I." Id.
118. See 103 S. Ct. at 2811-16 (White, J., dissenting)(appendix). In September of 1976,
the House of Representatives nearly passed a bill that would have subjected virtually all of the
independent regulatory agencies to the legislative veto. See H.R. Res. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976), defeated,.122 CONG. REC. H10718-19 (1976).
119. 103 S. Ct. at 2811-16 (White, J., dissenting) (appendix of statutes affected).
120. This note is concerned only with the legislative veto as it applies to federal laws.
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have been presented with the issue, and only three have reached the
merits.1 21
It was then with great anticipation that the courts and constitu-
tional law experts alike awaited the Supreme Court's decision in
Chadha. In light of the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Chadha v. INS,122
the Supreme Court surely felt that it could no longer delay expres-
sing an opinion. While the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's con-
clusion, the analysis used was somewhat different. Justice Powell's
concurring opinion echoed reasoning similar to that expressed by the
court of appeals." 8 Like Justice Powell, the Ninth Circuit was also
concerned with rendering an unnecessarily broad ruling." 4 Thus,
For a good discussion of the use of the veto in state statutes, see Levinson, Legislative and
Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 Wm. &
MAitY L. REV. 79 (1982).
121. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, cert denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1977) (per
curiam)(en banc), was the first federal court to directly confront the constitutionality of the
one-House veto provision. In that action, a group of federal judges contested the use of a one-
House veto in barring an increase in their salary. Relying primarily on the necessary and
proper clause, the Court of Claims found the veto provision constitutional and within the
mandates of the separation of powers doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit was the second federal court to address the issue, Chadha v. INS, 634
F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), affid, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), finding the legislative veto in the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 unconstitutional.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit invalidated a House of Representatives resolution vetoing Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission regulations on national gas prices. Process Gas Consum-
ers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America (CECA), 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); Interstate National Gas Ass'n of America v. CECA, 673 F.2d
425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), af/'d, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); Petrochemical Energy Group v. CECA,
673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff d, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); American Gas Ass'n v. CECA,
673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
The Court has, though, had other opportunities to address the issue. In Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (en banc), a legislative veto existed in the Federal Elections
Campaign Act, but the Court stated that it had " no occasion" to consider the question in
determining the validity of that statute. Id. at 140 n.176. That same veto provision surfaced
again in Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (en banc), affd sub nom,
Clark v. Kimmit, 431 U.S. 950 (1977), but the challenge to its validity was dismissed for lack
of standing. A dismissal on similar grounds was entered on another veto provision attack in
Cintronell-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 420 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. Ala. 1976). See
also McCorckle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977) (inseverability of veto provi-
sion precludes decision as to its validity).
While courts have generally been able to avoid reaching a decision on the merits, several
judges have expressed their conclusions through separate opinions. Compare Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. at 284-86 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (one-House veto
constitutional) with Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d at 678, 684-90 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (one-
House veto unconstitutional).
122. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). See supra note 121.
123. 103 S. Ct. at 2788-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
124. The court stated:
[W]e are not here faced with a situation in which the unforeseeability of future
circumstances or the broad scope and complexity of the subject matter of an
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the court of appeals's decision rested on the separation of powers
doctrine, but applied on a narrower basis. s5 As noted earlier, that
decision was reached through analysis primarily applicable to only
section 244(c)(2) of the Act. Had the Court then chosen to affirm
under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, some legislative veto provisions
may have been able to pass constitutional muster.'" Other actions
would have had to have been brought in order to decide the constitu-
tionality of legislative veto provisions on a case-by-case basis. How-
ever, the Supreme Court avoided that possibilityl' 7 by treating the
Act's veto provision as all-encompassing, and typical.
The propriety of this assumption, though, is debatable. Indeed,
that provision may have been atypical. As one author noted, "The
Chadha case presents the Court with a somewhat anachronistic, and
perhaps unusually vulnerable, use of the legislative veto.' u2  The
point of this argument was that the possibility of other constituional
issues being at stake in the use of the legislative veto under the Act"29
may result in the Court increasing its scrutiny, and in doing so, in-
creasing the likelihood of a finding of invalidity. Yet, if this is the
case, the majority'80 gives no hint of it in their opinion. Rather, the
agency's rulemaking authority preclude the articulation of specific criteria in the
governing statute itself. Such factors might present considerations different from
those we find here, both as to the question of separation of powers and the
legitimacy of the unicameral device. 634 F.2d at 433.
125. The Court of Appeals held that under the legislative veto,
[Tihe Executive's duty of faithful execution of the laws becomes meaningless, as
the law to be executed in a given case remains tentative until after action by the
Executive has ceased. The role of judicial review in determining the procedural
or substantive fairness of administrative action becomes equally nugatory be-
cause ex parte influence on administrative decisionmakers, once condemned,
now is made the norm. Id. at 436.
126. See supra note 96. The Ninth Circuit was addressing the constitutionality of the
legislative veto provision as employed under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
Thus, the decision could, and it was apparently the intent of the court that it should (see supra
note 124), be read as maintaining that the courts, or the Executive pursuant to properly dele-
gated power (as under the Act), should be the only bodies making ultimate decisions regarding
deportability. This reading would be in keeping with the Supreme Court's majority opinion
statement that once authority is delegated, "Congress must abide by [that] delegation ... until
[it) is legislatively altered or revoked." 103 S. Ct. at 2786.
127. Even though it may have avoided a case-by-case approach in regard to determining
a legislative veto's validity, the Court may still have to address veto provisions individually on
the basis of its severability analysis. See infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text.
128. Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power,
68 VA. L. REv. 253, 261 n.22 (1982).
129. Recall the due process and Bill of Attainder issues suggested by Justice Powell's
concurring opinion. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. See also 634 F.2d at 428-
32.
130. This majority does not include Justice Powell's vote, which as noted earlier, was
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Court seemed sufficiently provoked by the other aspects of section
244(c)(2), which it addressed.
To be sure, the Court decided the case on narrower grounds.
The Court, like Justice Powell and the Ninth Circuit, could have
decided the question on a more limited separation of powers basis,101
finding that Congress was acting outside of its sphere of power. Or,
as one commentator suggests, the Court could have "held one-
[H]ouse vetoes illegal, but two-[H]ouse" vetoes permissible.1 ' In
any event, the fact that the majority did not choose to limit the scope
of its decision confirms its intent to conclusively resolve the issue.
Whether that goal was attained, however, warrants further
discussion.
After Chadha, there is little doubt about the Court's desire to
invalidate the legislative veto. 8 s Although initially there was some
question as to the Court's true intent, 1" those questions were at least
partially answered by Supreme Court action taken only a couple of
weeks subsequent to the Chadha decision. On July 6, 1983, the
Court refused to hear six other cases involving the legislative veto
which had been pending on its docket.l s Those cases, also concern-
ing appellate court findings that legislative veto provisions were un-
constitutional, were either affirmed or writs of certiorari were de-
nied."8 ' Their outcome apparently hinged on the decision in
seemingly influenced by the presence of other constitutional issues. See supra note 97.
131. See supra note 96.
132. L.A. Daily J., June 24, 1983, § 1, at 1, ol. 6. The permissibility of the two-House
veto, would only have resulted from a majority decision finding the one-House veto invalid on
bicameral grounds alone. This conclusion is necessitated by the fact that a two-House veto, or
for that matter any type of legislative veto, would still not appear to satisfy the majority's
presentment clause analysis.
133. One observer noted, "The Court was seizing the opportunity to rule as broadly and
in the strongest language possible on the question." Id. In addition, it goes without saying that
the impressive majority vote (7-2) lends further credence to the argument that the Court was
intent on rendering a definitive ruling.
134. Id.
135. Those cases involving the legislative veto which the Court refused to hear are:
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America (CECA), 673 F.2d
425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); Interstate National Gas Ass'n v. CECA,
673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); Petrochemical Energy Group v.
CECA, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), a f'd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); American Gas Ass'n v.
CECA, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C.Cir. 1982), ajJd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); United States Senate v.
CECA, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); United States
House of Representatives v. CECA, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
3556 (1983); United States Senate v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aJJd, 103 S. Ct.
3556 (1983); United States House of Representatives v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
affd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
136. See supra note 135.
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Chadha. Having decided that case, the Court was able to reaffirm its
decision there by summarily disposing of these other legislative veto
cases. As one observer proclaimed, "The Supreme Court's refusal to
review the [cases] removes any doubt that might have existed that the
justices' decision in Chadha was a sweeping condemnation of the
veto principle. '187 Justice White, who, along with Justice Rehn-
quist, voted to hear the other legislative veto cases, confirmed, stating
in a short opinion that the Court's action in refusing to hear the
cases illustrated the "constitutional myopia" of the earlier ruling in
Chadha."'
In an effort to decide who, between Congress and the President,
was the winner after Chadha, some commentators argued that as a
consequence of the decision, the Executive Branch had more
power, 89 while others predicted that Congress would be the ultimate
winner.1" That question should be asked, but not in such simplistic
terms. The truth is that there is no clear winner-only a situation
that will demand, as the Framers intended, continued accomodation
between the two branches. For instance, while it may appear at first
glance that executive actions cannot go unchecked, an alternative
reading suggests that the President has been granted no new consti-
tutional power because Congress will be more likely to restrict its
delegation in the future. Therefore, the questions that must be asked
in light of this decision are: what alternatives, if any, should Con-
gress now turn to to validly maintain its oversight functions; and,
what acts, if any, are rendered invalid by this decision, and how does
their invalidity affect both executive and legislative power?
The extensive placement of the legislative veto over the last fifty
years would appear to indicate Congress's preoccupation and reli-
ance on the device. As one observer notes, "When [the veto] was
invented in the 1930's, [it] was supposed to allow the [P]resident to
reorganize the [E]xecutive [BIranch without undue congressional in-
terference. . . . By the 1970's, the legislative veto had acquired a
very different symbolism.' 4' That "symbolism" was that the device
had been inserted into foreign policy legislation and other statutes to
137. L.A. Daily J., July 7, 1983, § 1, at 16, col. 2.
138. 103 S. Ct. at 3556-57 (White, J., dissenting).
139. See, e.g., L.A. Daily J., June 27, 1983, § 1, at 2, col. 6; L.A. Daily J., July 8,
1983, § 1, at 3, cols. 1-2; N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, § 1, at I cols. 5-6; NEWSWEEK, July 4,
1983, at 16.
140. See e.g., L.A. Daily J., June 28, 1983, § 1, at 4, cols. 1-2; N.Y. Times, June 24,
1983, § 1, at 1, cols. 5-6 and at B4, cols. 3-5.
141. L.A. Daily J., June 28, 1983, § 1, at 4, col. 1.
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"limit the discretion of executive branch regulatory agencies."'14'
However, "placement" is different than "use." To be sure, Congress
was more than generous in its insertion of veto provisions, but the
fact that the legislative veto was more of a threat than a weapon is
illustrated by Congress's relatively little actual use of it. 4'
While Congress may have been somewhat reluctant to apply it,
the impact attributed to the legislative veto's presence has not been
entirely unnoticeable. The device proved useful in "making indepen-
dent regulatory agencies politically accountable for their actions,"
and as a result, eroding the independence of these agencies and the
executive branch.1 ' Although the legislative veto may have been an
influencing factor for some overly zealous regulatory agencies, the
death of the legislative veto does not mean that Congress will no
longer have any control over these agencies as many observers ini-
tially declared.1  Indeed, instead of invoking the veto, "Congress has
[been exercising] control over regulatory agencies-and over the
[P]resident-by the political tools provided it in the Constitution."""
The bottom line is that Congress has a variety of alternatives to con-
sider; while a discussion of those alternatives is beyond the scope of
this note,147 suffice it to say that they can provide that body with the
oversight power it requires.
The Court confirmed this fact, stating that its decision does not
mean that Congress is "required to capitulate to the 'accretion of
policy control by forces outside its chambers,' "148 but that the Con-
stitution provides it with sufficient mechanisms of control.14 ' At
142. Id.
143. "In the last five years. Congress exercised its veto thirty-one times, [and] usually on
minor issues. [For instance], Congress has never vetoed an arms sale ... " N.Y. Times, June
24, 1983, at B4, col. 1.
144. Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 735, 737 (1979).
145. As one observer confirmed, "If [there is a shift in power], it may prove to be some-
thing less than tidal." Wall St. J., July 8, 1983, § 1, at 16, col. 1.
146. L.A. Daily J., June 27, 1983, § 1, at 2, col. 5. Those "tools" are, for example,
related to Congress' appropriation, legislation drafting, and delegation powers. See generally
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1 and 8. Moreover, those "tools" are unaffected by the Chadha deci-
sion, as Chadha goes only towards the invalidation of the legislative veto. See infra note 148
and accompanying text.
147. For commentary on alternatives to the legislative veto, see generally Kaiser, Con-
gressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto", 32 AD. L.
REV. 667 (1980) and Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative
Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79 (1982).
148. 103 S. Ct. at 2786 n.19 (quoting Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the
Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 455, 462 (1977)).
149. 103 S. Ct. at 2786 n.19. But cf. 103 S. Ct. at 2795 and 2795 n.10 (White, J.,
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most, Congress will only be inconvenienced by some additional work,
but should they "respond with better written laws and more scrupu-
lous oversight, the Court's decision will serve to enhance rather than
diminish the proper legislative powers of Congress."'150
While there is no question that this decision will force Congress
to reassess and reorganize its current delegatory process,15 the over-
riding issue presented by the Chadha decision involves the fate of
those laws containing legislative veto provisions. 1" Generally, invalid
portions of a statute will be severed "[u]nless it is evident that the
legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within
its power, independently of that which is not." 1"' As discussed ear-
lier, the Court in Chadha had little trouble in determining the Leg-
islature's intent, for the Act contained a severability clause. '" Thus,
section 244(c)(2) was severed, leaving the rest of section 244 intact
and valid. At this point it is unclear whether that procedure will be
applicable to all of the other laws affected, or whether some entire
laws will be rendered ineffective by the decision.
This uncertainty stems from the Court's failure to address the
severability issue in broader terms. While the Court has made it
clear that affected provisions will be presumed severable, it is by no
means certain that all legislative veto provisions will be able to meet
the criteria for satisfying the presumption. Thus, the Court's failure
to shed more light in this area raises some important questions re-
garding executive branch power. For instance, if some veto provi-
sions cannot be severed, and as a result the acts are rendered invalid,
the authority of the President or Executive Branch regulatory agen-
cies could be sharply curtailed. On the other hand, if veto provisions
are severed from acts delegating a great deal of power to the Presi-
dissenting) (alternatives not adequate).
150. L.A. Daily J., June 27, 1983, § 1, at 2, col. 6. In its first action after the Supreme
Court decision in Chadha was handed down, Congress passed a bill prohibiting the Consumer
Product Safety Commission from using any newly authorized funds to implement a regulation
until it is approved by Congress. See L.A. Daily J., June 30, 1983, § 1, at 3, cois. 2-4.
151. In the aftermath of the Court's decision, both Houses of Congress indicated that
task forces would be organized to "explore the extent of the damage." NEwswEEK, July 4,
1983, at 16. See also N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983 § 1, at 1, col. 5.
152. See supra note 104.
153. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932),
reaFf'd, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976).
154. Such a clause is also known as a "separability clause." Under either term, it is
similar to the one found in § 406 of the Act, printed below:
If any particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person
or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of
such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby. 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (1983).
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dent or these agencies, such as foreign affairs statutes, Presidential
power may be greatly increased in already permissive 1" areas.
While it is, of course, too early to speculate to any great degree,
certainly the invalidation of any statute will have some repercus-
sions. Likewise, even the severance of legislative veto provisions may
provide unexpected ramifications. Furthermore, an already
overburdened Congress would seemingly have to relegislate in the
affected area.
Since the Supreme Court's analysis appears to imply that sever-
ance is the rule rather than the exception, ' " perhaps the issue is not
as distressing as it seems. One Justice Department official has said
that after the Department reviews the laws involved, in most cases
"[they] will come to the conclusion that veto provisions can be sepa-
rated. 157 The accuracy of this statement, however, seems to rest on
whether the Court's severability analysis is met.
Besides determining the Legislature's intent, 1" the Court also
presumes a provision's severability if what remains after severance
"is fully operative as a law."'15 This requirement did not present a
problem in Chadha, but may with other affected laws. Of the fifty-
seven laws listed in the appendix to Justice White's dissent, only ten
have severability clauses. ' 60 In addition, many have more than one
legislative veto provision, with the provisions often intertwined
throughout the act.'" Thus, depending on the extent of veto provi-
sion usage in a statute, it seems fairly plausible that some laws will
be so infected with veto provisions, that severability will leave these
statutes completely inoperative. Given this supposition, it is reasona-
bly clear that more than a Justice Department review will be needed
to determine the constitutionality of at least some of these laws.
Hence, instead of conclusively resolving the issue, the Court has
155. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
(Court recognizes inherently broad Presidential power in foreign affairs).
156. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
157. Wall St. J., June 24, 1983, § 1, at 2, col. 2.
158. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
159. Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234.
160. Among those acts without severability clauses are, for example: International Se-
curity Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 211, 90 Stat. 729
(concurrent resolution may disapprove President's offer to sell arms), and the National Aero-
nautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 302c, 72 Stat. 426 (concurrent resolu-
tion may disapprove President's transfer of functions to National Air and Space
Administration).
161. For instance, the primary purpose for enacting the War Powers Res. Act of 1973,
50 U.S.C. § 1544 (1976), was to monitor (and by concurrent resolution, overrule) the Presi-
dent's use of U.S. armed forces abroad. See Studies, supra note 3.
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opened the floodgates for hundreds of test cases. Moreover, as evi-
denced from the presence of Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion,
lower courts will be subjected to the difficult task of applying the
often confusing and complex severability analysis.'" Many observers
had hoped that the Court would shed some light in this area through
its decision in the other legislative veto cases pending during
Chadha."' However, as noted earlier, those cases were denied
hearings.
E. Conclusion
In holding section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has made a strong
statement regarding its current position on how the Constitution
should be read. Its analysis, based primarily on the constitutional
language of article I, reflects rigid and strict construction; in effect,
illustrating that the requirements of the Constitution are adaptable,
but not subject to change. By construing the House's resolution
under section 244(c)(2) as legislation, invalidation of the legislative
veto was then just a matter of applying basic constitutional princi-
ples. Namely, all legislation must go through the full legislative pro-
cess: first, passage by both Houses of Congress, and second, present-
ment to the President. This approach connotes that the
Constitution's provisions will be made to apply irrespective of
whether there is a more efficient way. Justice White's dissent argued
that the majority's opinion reflected an insensitivity to the require-
ments of the modern "administrative state," 1  but as one commenta-
tor has stated, "the Constitution was written in pervasive distrust of
the administrative state and with a settled determination to bend the
state's requirements to the requirements of liberty." '  Whatever the
requirements of the administrative state may be, Congress has all the
tools it needs to perform its role, and thus concern in this direction is
misplaced. Real concern with the majority opinion should be on leg-
islation with legislative veto provisions. Not only will lower courts be
162. As evidenced by the Champlin opinion (see supra notes 153 and 159), severability
analysis requires determination of relatively difficult-to-discern factors. For instance, legislative
intent is usually susceptible to a number of interpretations. As one observer notes, "future
severability litigation is virtually certain given the discrete nature of the issues and the flexibil-
ity inherent in reconstructing the legislative intent of a past Congress." Rein & Stone, L.egisla-
tive Veto: Can Congress Go Back to Basics?, LEGAL TiMrs, July 25, 1983, at 40, col. 2.
163. See supra note 135.
164. 103 S. Ct. at 2810 (White, J., dissenting).
165. L.A. Daily J., June 28, 1983, § 1, at 4, col. 2.
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inundated by severability issues as a result of the decision, but the
Court's failure to expressly reveal the breadth of its holding will in-
cite ambitious lawyers all over the country to attempt to distinguish
this one-House veto analysis to avoid its inherently sweeping effect.
However, to the Court's surprise, and perhaps dismay, the Chadha
ruling may not have been broad enough.
Robert A. Weikert

